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1. INTRODUCTION: FROM THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE TO THE
RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT
State sovereignty has long been regarded as the pivotal structural
paradigm of international law.1 Its recognition in Article 2(1) of the U.N.
Charter as a fundamental, albeit qualified, principle of the United Nations is
only one of many indicators that it has not forfeited its significance. At the
same time, the rising importance of the protection of human rights raises the
question of how to reconcile the inherent tension between these two
principles. In the modem international legal order, it has become clear that the
treatment of human beings within the territorial boundaries of a state does not
belong to the domaine rbservj that excludes interferences from the outside.
Yet it is far from clear how the international community-represented through
the United Nations, regional organizations, and individual states or groups of
states-should act and is allowed to act when a state commits major human
rights violations such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes
against humanity. When diplomatic efforts and political or economic
sanctions fail, military action in the form of a humanitarian intervention is
often considered as a last resort.
Following the Cold War and the revitalization of the U.N. system of
collective security, the question of the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention gained practical importance. In the 1990s, massive human rights
violations led to fierce debate, especially in cases where the U.N. Security
Council did not authorize an intervention. In 1994, the international
community failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda due to the lack of
political will and determination among the main political actors. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing of Kosovo in 1999 to end
ethnic cleansing and other mass atrocities, despite the absence of Security
Council authorization, added to the controversy. By the end of the twentieth
century, the world was deeply divided into proponents who regarded
humanitarian intervention as often the only effective means to address
massive human rights violations and critics to whom humanitarian
intervention was nothing but a rhetorical and euphemistic pretext under which
the great powers pursued their imperialist self-interests through coercive
measures.
Against this background, the concept of the responsibility to protect
constitutes an attempt to change the prefix of the ongoing debate about the
legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. 2 At the core of the
concept lies a two-dimensional understanding of responsibility: (1) the
responsibility of a state to protect its citizens from atrocities, and (2) the
responsibility of the international community to prevent and react to massive
human rights violations. The concept moves the debate past the controversial
notion of "humanitarian intervention" to a "responsibility to protect," thereby
focusing on the perspective of the victims of human rights violations.
Conceptually it tries to cut the Gordian knot of the tension between
I. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (2d ed. 2005).
2. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY To
PROTECT (2001) (hereinafter ICISS REPORT].
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sovereignty and human rights by embedding the notion of human rights in the
idea of state sovereignty. Under this premise, intervention within a state that
fails to protect its citizens from massive human rights violations does not
constitute an intrusion into that state's sovereignty, but rather appears as the
realization of a responsibility which is shared by the state and by the
international community.
The introduction of the responsibility to protect has significantly
changed the grammar of political discourse with regard to the prevention of
and reaction to massive human rights violations. The implications of the
concept for the international legal order, however, are seldom analyzed in
greater depth. If its legal dimension is discussed, the responsibility to protect
is usually regarded as a legal norm de legeferenda, as an emerging norm of
customary international law.3 Proponents of this approach regularly do not
provide much evidence for the existence of such a process, nor do they
elaborate how and under which conditions the responsibility to protect could
emerge as a norm of customary international law.
In this Note, I reject this contemporary understanding of the
responsibility to protect. Instead I argue that the responsibility to protect
cannot be understood as an emerging international legal norm, and any such
characterization is misleading. As a multifaceted and holistic concept, the
responsibility to protect lacks specific normative content and does not
"indicat[e] to a designated audience that certain things must henceforth be
done or forborne." 4 I also demonstrate that the conceptual change in the
understanding of sovereignty cannot, by itself, lead to a change in
international law. The concept does, however, touch upon a number of
existing norms or potential norms of international law, and the increasing
political recognition of the concept raises the question whether endorsement
of the responsibility to protect may have a legal impact on these norms. The
concept of the responsibility to protect therefore has to be viewed within the
context of the existing international legal system of the use of force and
collective security as it is defined and shaped primarily by the U.N. Charter.
An analysis of the legal dimension of the responsibility to protect must not
focus on the legal status of the concept. Rather, it must examine whether and
how the concept of the responsibility to protect, and especially the behavior
and statements of the relevant international actors in the context of the
development of the concept, may have changed the legal content of the
existing norms which form the basis of the international system of collective
security.
The argument begins in Part II with an inquiry into the evolution and
content of the responsibility to protect from its establishment in 2001 until the
consultation of the subject by the 63rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly
in July 2009. Part III then outlines the process of international lawmaking in
which the responsibility to protect can influence the substantive corpus of
international law. Against this doctrinal background, Part IV evaluates
3. Id. 12.24, 6.17; see infra Part 111.
4. W. Michael Reisman, The Democratization of Contemporary International Law-Making
Processes and the Differentiation of Their Application, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
TREATY MAKING 15, 16 (Riidiger Wolfrum & Volker Roben eds., 2005).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 35:469
whether and how the concept has already influenced the specific norms which
constitute the international legal framework for the use of force and collective
security. Concluding remarks in Part V will assess and evaluate the impact of
the responsibility to protect on the international legal order.
The analysis will result in the counterintuitive outcome-given the
controversy around the concept-that the responsibility to protect does not
entail revolutionary changes within the existing legal framework. In the
Conclusion, I will show why this rather conservative approach to the legal
status of the responsibility to protect is to be welcomed and may expedite the
acceptance of the responsibility to protect in the long run.
II. EVOLUTION AND CONTENT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
A. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (2001)
In his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in 2000, then-
Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan addressed the issue of
humanitarian intervention. 5 Moved by the humanitarian catastrophes of the
1990s, he acknowledged critics' concerns about the concept of humanitarian
intervention and its application in practice.6 But with regard to the need to
react to humanitarian catastrophes within the territory of a state, Kofi Annan
then posed the much cited question: "[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed,
an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda,
to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of human rights that
offend every precept of our common humanity? ' '7 In his statement humanity
and sovereignty appear as two conflicting principles, and the question arises:
"[W]hich principle should prevail when they are in conflict?" 8
Responding to Annan's appeal, the government of Canada established
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty9 (ICISS)
and tasked it to approach the problem of humanitarian intervention in a
comprehensive manner, with the aim of finding global common ground. In
December 2001, the Commission, co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed
Sahnoun, issued its report entitled The Responsibility To Protect, and the
concept prominently entered the international stage.
The ICISS Report proposes a conceptual change in the discussion about
humanitarian intervention. First, it suggests shifting the debate from the "right
to intervene" to the "responsibility to protect."' 0 The aim of this "rhetorical
trick" is not only to avoid-at least terminologically-the highly disputed
term of humanitarian intervention, but also to broaden the concept away from
5. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the




9. For a comprehensive account of the work of the ICISS and the development of its report,
see ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT 35-65 (2009).
10. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 2.28-.33.
11. Carsten Stahn, Responsibility To Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?,
101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 102 (2007).
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mere intervention to a more comprehensive approach that also comprises
prevention and post-conflict support. 12 Furthermore, it suggests a change in
perspective away from the point of view of those who try to justify
intervention to the perspective of those who are affected and seek support.'
3
Second, the concept tries to dissolve the tension between state sovereignty and
intervention by emphasizing that sovereignty implies a responsibility of the
state to protect its citizens from human rights violations.14 Human rights and
the concept of human security are thus not conceived of as limitations but
rather as inherent elements of sovereignty. When the state is unable or
unwilling to fulfill its sovereign responsibility, "it becomes the responsibility
of the international community to act in its place."' 5 Under this assumption,
intervention does not contradict the principle of sovereignty, but rather
complements it where a state does not live up to its responsibility. 6
The ICISS Report divides the responsibility to protect into three sub-
responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild.' 7 The
responsibility to prevent consists of measures aimed at avoiding massive
human rights violations in the first place. It emphasizes the importance of
early warning mechanisms and root-cause conflict prevention, as well as
diplomatic, economic, and military instruments to confine a conflict before it
escalates. 18 The responsibility to rebuild comprises responsibilities which
arise after a conflict, particularly after a military intervention has been
conducted, and aims to support the sustainable development of a stable and
safe society.' 9 The responsibility to react constitutes the normative core of the
responsibility to protect. It applies when massive human rights violations
occur in a state and that state is either unable or unwilling to protect its
citizens. In this case, coercive measures short of military action should be
taken, including diplomatic, economic, or military sanctions such as arms
embargoes or financial restrictions. 20 Military action should only be
acceptable in extreme cases of large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing and
when four criteria are met: (1) military interventions have to be motivated by
the right intention; (2) they must be the last resort; (3) they must be
proportional; and, (4) there must be a reasonable chance of ending the
suffering.
2 1
The development of criteria for legitimizing humanitarian intervention
does not, however, answer the pressing question of who can authorize
intervention. In this regard, the ICISS Report takes a rather cautious approach
and emphasizes the pivotal role of the Security Council under the U.N.
Charter.22 Should the Security Council fail to react, the report considers action
12. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 2.28-.29.
13. Id. 12.29.
14. Id. 1.35, 2.15.
15. Id. 2.29.
16. Jeremy I. Levitt, The Responsibility To Protect: A Beaver Without a Dam?, 25 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 153, 157 (2003) (book review).
17. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 2.29.
18. Id. 13.1-.43.
19. Id. 15.1-.31.
20. Id. In 4.3-.9.
21. Id. 114.19,4.32-.43.
22. Id. 6.13-.15.
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by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution 23 to be a
possible alternative that would "provide a high degree of legitimacy for an
intervention." 24 The report also mentions the action of regional organizations,
although it highlights that according to the U.N. Charter, such action can only
be taken with authorization of the Security Council. 25 Concerning the most
controversial question, humanitarian intervention without Security Council
authorization, the report on the one hand observes the lack of a global
consensus, while on the other hand avoids explicitly deeming such
interventions illegal.26 The ICISS Report points out that there will be damage
to the international order if the Security Council is bypassed. But it also
emphasizes that there will be "damage to that order if human beings are
slaughtered while the Security Council stands by."27 The ICISS thereby
cautions the Security Council that single states or coalitions might take action
if the Council fails to live up to its responsibility.
28
The ICISS Report ultimately recommends that the General Assembly
endorse the responsibility to protect, that the members of the Security Council
try to find agreement on principles for military intervention, that the
permanent members of the Security Council agree to restrict the use of their
veto power in cases where humanitarian intervention is necessary and their
vital state interests are not involved, and that the Secretary-General consider
29how the responsibility to protect can best be advanced.
B. The Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change (2004)
The concept of the responsibility to protect, as developed in the ICISS
Report, was then considered by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, convened by then-Secretary-General Annan in order to evaluate
the adequacy of existing policies and institutions with regard to current threats
to international peace and security. Like the ICISS, the High-Level Panel
highlights the responsibility of the state for the welfare of its people as well as
the collective international responsibility to protect. 30 The panel confirms the
competence of the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter when massive human rights violations occur, 31 and urges the
permanent members to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide and
large-scale human rights abuses. 32 In conclusion, the High-Level Panel
endorses "the emerging norm that there is a collective international
23. Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 3, 1950).





29. Id. " 8.28-.30.
30. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, 9 29, 36, 202-203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter
High-Level Panel Report].
31. Id. 200, 202.
32. Id. 256.
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responsibility to protect" which is to be exercised by the Security Council. 33 It
invites the Security Council and the General Assembly to use the developed
guidelines for authorizing force in declaratory resolutions.
34
Nevertheless, the High-Level Panel Report significantly departs from the
ICISS Report. The High-Level Panel focuses much more on action taken by
the Security Council and does not discuss the possibility of authorizations by
the General Assembly or action by states or regional organizations outside the
U.N. framework.35 The report develops criteria for the legitimacy of the use of
force similar to those suggested by the ICISS, but limits the application of
these criteria to the use of force authorized by the Security Council.36 While
the High-Level Panel Report supports the conceptual change in the
understanding of sovereignty as responsibility and the emphasis that the
responsibility for the well-being of human beings is shared between the state
and the international community, the operational content of the responsibility
to protect is remarkably more restrictive.
C. The Report of the Secretary-General In Larger Freedom (2005)
In his 2005 report, In Larger Freedom, the Secretary-General states that
the responsibility to protect should be embraced and, when necessary, acted
upon. T In contrast to the High-Level Panel, which discusses the responsibility
to protect in the context of the use of force, the Secretary-General returns to
the broader understanding of the ICISS Report by placing his assessment of
the responsibility to protect in context with the principles of human dignity
and the rule of law. With regard to the use of force, the Secretary-General also
focuses on the Security Council and does not discuss the possibility of
humanitarian interventions without authorization of the Council38: "The task
is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but
to make it work better."39 He also endorses the criteria for the legitimate use
of force as developed by the High-Level Panel and urges the Security Council
to adopt them.
40
D. The 2005 World Summit Outcome
Until 2005, the responsibility to protect had only been considered by the
Secretary-General and specialized commissions. This changed at the
September 2005 World Summit, when the heads of state and government
convening at the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the responsibility to
33. Id. 1203.
34. Id 1 208.
35. See Stahn, supra note 11, at 105-06.
36. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30,1 207.
37. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Toward
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter In Larger Freedom].
38. Id. 1 125-126.
39. Id. 1 126.
40. Id.
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protect.41 The state representatives explicitly acknowledged that each state has
the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity and pledged to act in accordance with
it.42 They emphasized that the international community should not only help
states to exercise their responsibility but that the international community has
a responsibility of its own to help protect populations.4 3 This responsibility
has to be exercised in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the U.N.
Charter, and where necessary, collective action through the Security Council
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter should be taken. " The Outcome
Document stresses the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect, bearing in mind the principles of
the U.N. Charter as well as those of international law. 5
The World Summit Outcome Document acknowledges the concept of
the responsibility to protect but demonstrates significant restraint with regard
to the responsibility of the international community. While the ICISS Report
applied to "large scale loss of life," or "large scale 'ethnic cleansing," 4 the
Outcome Document limits the scope of the responsibility to protect to the
international crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity. 7 The significance the ICISS Report attributed to prevention
is hardly noticeable in the Outcome Document. Furthermore, it explicitly
recognizes a collective responsibility only concerning diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means. With regard to collective action under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the heads of state and government more
vaguely state that they are prepared to act in a timely manner and on the basis
of a case-by-case evaluation. They neither explicitly recognize specific
responsibilities of the Security Council, nor mention the possibility of
unilateral or collective action with the authorization of the General Assembly
or outside of the U.N. framework. The idea of criteria for an authorization of
the use of force was also dropped.
E. Subsequent Endorsement and Criticism of the Responsibility To
Protect
Following the World Summit, the concept of the responsibility to protect
entered into discussions and statements of organs of the United Nations,
regional organizations, and representatives of states. Single states have
mentioned the concept in the deliberations of the Security Council since
41. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005)
[hereinafter World Summit Outcome Document]. For an overview of the different positions held by
states with regard to the responsibility to protect, see Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility To Protect
Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 191, 201-05 (2008).
42. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 41,7 138.
43. Id 7 138-139.
44. Id. 139.
45. Id.
46. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 4.19.
47. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 41, 138-139.
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2002,48 and in 2004, the representative of the Philippines made reference to it
in the context of a resolution dealing with Darfur. 49 The first explicit
acknowledgement in a resolution occurred in 2006, when the Security Council
referred to the relevant paragraphs of the World Summit Outcome Document
and explicitly reaffirmed the responsibility to protect with regard to the
protection of civilians in armed conflict. 50 The Security Council also
acknowledged the concept with regard to the situation in Darfur.5 I Moreover,
a High-Level Mission appointed by the Human Rights Council to assess the
human rights situation in Darfur assumed that Sudan, as well as the
international community, had the obligation to exercise their responsibility to
protect the people of Darfur.
52
However, an episode during the budgetary deliberations of the 62nd
General Assembly in 2007 and 2008 showed that not all states approve the
concept unconditionally. In an effort to facilitate the development of the
responsibility to protect and to complement the work of the Special Adviser
on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon decided in 2007 to appoint a Special Adviser on the Responsibility
To Protect and presented this decision to the President of the Security
Council53 and to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly.5 4 A number of
delegations expressed their disapproval of this appointment, indicating that it
was for the General Assembly to decide on the establishment of new posts.
55
This criticism was clearly aimed at the attempt to embed the responsibility to
protect in the institutional framework of the United Nations without prior
consultation of the General Assembly. It was not until February 2008 that the
Secretary-General could appoint Edward Luck as Special Adviser. 56 Even
then, the term responsibility to protect vanished from the post description-
the special adviser's work will only "include" the responsibility to protect57-
and protests from Cuba, Sudan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran, Venezuela, and
48. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4660th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4660 (Resumption
1) (Dec. 10, 2002) (statement of Canada); see also U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4660th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.4660 (Dec. 10, 2002) (statement of Norway).
49. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5015th mtg. at 10-11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5015 (July 30, 2004)
(statement of the Philippines); see also S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004).
50. S.C. Res. 1674, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); see also S.C. Res. 1894,
pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009).
51. S.C. Res. 1706, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
52. U.N. Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of
15 March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council: " Report of the High-Level Mission on the Situation of
Human Rights in Darfur Pursuant to Human Rights Council Decision S-4/101, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/80
(Mar. 9, 2007).
53. Letter from Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Sec'y-Gen., to President of the U.N. Sec. Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2007/721 (Dec. 7, 2007).
54. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, Estimates in Respect of Special
Political Missions, Good Offices, and Other Political Initiatives Authorized by the General Assembly
and/or the Security Council, 31, U.N. Doc. A/62/512/Add. I (Oct. 30, 2007).
55. Their disapproval was supported by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions, which noted that the establishment of this position was a policy matter and should
therefore be decided by the General Assembly. See General Assembly, Thirtieth Report of the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the Proposed Programme Budget for the
Biennium 2008-2009, 15, U.N. Doc. A/62/7/Add.29 (Dec. 14, 2007).
56. Press Release, Sec'y-Gen., Secretary-General Appoints Edward C. Luck of United States
Special Adviser, U.N. Doc. SG/A/1 120 (Feb. 21, 2008).
57. Id.
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Nicaragua continued in the Fifth Committee. 58
F. The Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the
Responsibility To Protect (2009)
Nevertheless, the Secretary-General issued a report, Implementing the
Responsibility To Protect, in 2009.59 Based on paragraphs 138 and 139 of the
World Summit Outcome Document, the Secretary-General emphasizes that
the concept of the responsibility to protect has received the consensus of all
world leaders. 60 He underlines that the concept not only represents a Western
approach but builds upon a global consensus with, for example, African states
taking a leading role. 61 With regard to the operationalization of the
responsibility to protect, the report suggests a three-pillar approach.62 The first
pillar consists of the responsibility of the state to protect its population from
serious crimes 63 The second pillar is the commitment of the international
community-consisting of states, regional organizations, civil society, and the
private sector-to support the state in complying with its obligations under the
first pillar.64 The third pillar comprises the timely and decisive response by the
international community should a state not live up to its responsibility to
protect.65 In the last situation, members of the international community should
resort to peaceful measures and, as a last resort, to coercive action in
compliance with the U.N. Charter. The report amplifies in further detail the
content of the three pillars, makes specific recommendations with regard to
how states and other international actors should assume their respective
responsibilities under the three-pillar approach, and asks the General
Assembly to consider its further policy with regard to implementing the
66
responsibility to protect.
G. The Responsibility To Protect and the 63rd Session of the General
Assembly
Preceding the opening of the 63rd General Assembly in 2009, the
President of the General Assembly circulated a Concept Note, in which he
emphasized that the responsibility to protect does not entail any legal
commitment but that it is for the General Assembly to develop and elaborate
such a legal basis. 67 He further highlighted the meaning and significance of
58. See Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Budget Committee Takes Up Report of Joint
Inspection Unit as It Begins Resumed Session, U.N. Doc. GA/AB/3836 (Mar. 3, 2008).
59. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility








66. Id. % 69-71.
67. Letter and Concept Note from Office of the President, U.N. Gen. Assembly, to Permanent
Missions and Permanent Observer Missions to the United Nations (July 17, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/letters/ResponsibilitytoProtect 170709.pdf.
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state sovereignty and pointed out that the use of force may only be authorized
by the Security Council against an immediate threat to international peace and
security. According to the President of the General Assembly, collective
security may not be regarded as an enforcement mechanism for international
human rights law and international humanitarian law.
68
In the General Assembly's debate on the responsibility to protect,
ninety-four member states submitted statements. The debate showed a broad
consensus with regard to the concept of the responsibility to protect as it was
recognized at the World Summit in 2005. 6 9 The General Assembly almost
unanimously highlighted the importance of prevention of serious crimes and
the responsibility of the international community to support states in the effort
to prevent or confine such crimes. Most states also welcomed the report of
the Secretary-General, and some delegates explicitly endorsed his three-pillar
approach. 7'
A number of states, however, voiced serious concerns. Some
emphasized the concept's potential for abuse as a pretext for unilateral
intervention and equated the responsibility to protect with humanitarian
intervention.72 Many states identified the composition of the Security Council
and the veto power of the permanent members as the major obstacles for
decisive and effective U.N. action.73 These states called for reform, looking
for ways to limit the use of the veto.74 Many states expressed a preference for
the General Assembly over the Security Council with regard to the
implementation of the responsibility to protect.75
Eventually, the General Assembly adopted a resolution, which reaffirms
the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter as well as the commitment to
the responsibility to protect in the World Summit Outcome Document in its
76preamble. In its operational paragraphs, the resolution "takes note" of the
Secretary-General's report-the initial proposal to "take note with
appreciation" did not find a consensus-and the General Assembly decides to
continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect.77 In his opening
statement to the 64th Session of the General Assembly, Secretary-General Ki-
68. Id. at 2.
69. See GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, IMPLEMENTING THE
RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT: THE 2009 GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE: AN ASSESSMENT 1 (2009),
http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/GCR2PGeneral AssemblyDebateAssessment.pdf; INT'L COAL. FOR
THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, REPORT ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY DEBATE ON THE
RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT 1 (2009), http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICRtoP%20Report-
GeneralAssemblyDebate on the ResponsiblitytoProtect%20FINAL%209_22 09.pdf.
70. GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 2, 6; INT'L COAL.
FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 5.
71. GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 5; INT'L COAL. FOR
THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 4-5.
72. GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 7; INT'L COAL. FOR
THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 7.
73. GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 6; INT'L COAL. FOR
THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 6.
74. GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 6; INT'L COAL. FOR
THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 6.
75. GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 7-8; INT'L COAL.
FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69, at 6.
76. G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009).
77. Id.
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Since its introduction in 2001, the concept of the responsibility to protect
has shaped international discourse on the prevention and containment of the
most serious crimes. The concept has found tremendous resonance among
states, international and regional organizations, as well as nonstate actors. The
international consensus extends to the general idea that it is the shared
responsibility of the state as well as of the international community to prevent
and contain genocide and other massive human rights violations. 79 However, a
tour d'horizon of the development of the concept shows that significantly
different understandings of the responsibility to protect exist. The details of
the concept, as developed by the ICISS in 2001, differ remarkably from the
2004 High-Level Panel Report, which was endorsed in principle by Secretary-
General Annan in 2005. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document reflects
an even narrower consensus. While the concept is widely accepted, single
implications which are associated with it are not. The uproar in the Fifth
Committee of the General Assembly caused by Secretary-General Ki-moon's
attempt to install a special representative on the responsibility to protect
shows how controversial the concept is. And although state representatives
and international organizations permanently endorse the concept, single states
and groups of states continue to emphasize the impermeability of state
sovereignty with regard to the domestic affairs of a state, to point out the
limited competences of the Security Council, and to emphasize that the
responsibility to protect has not yet gained legal force.
Against this background, the question arises whether the responsibility
to protect constitutes only a conceptual framework for political discourse or
whether it has legal implications. This question requires a closer examination
of the concept of the responsibility to protect in the light of the process of
international lawmaking.
III. THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING AND THE
LEGAL STATUS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT
The rise of the responsibility to protect as a widely acknowledged and
much discussed concept of international politics raises the question of its
status under international law. Can the responsibility to protect be regarded as
customary international law? Is it becoming a customary norm? Does it reflect
a conceptual change in the understanding of sovereignty that by itself entails
legally significant changes? The responsibility to protect has already been
characterized as an emerging principle of customary international law
78. Sec'y-Gen. Ban Ki-moon, United Nations, Opening Address at the General Debate of the
64th Session of the General Assembly: Now Is Our Time (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/sgopen-en.pdf.
79. See, e.g., Stahn, supra note 11, at 118.
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in the ICISS Report.80 Similarly, the High-Level Panel Report speaks of an
C4 81 82
emerging norm, '  an assessment shared by the Secretary-General . The
World Summit Outcome Document, on the other hand, is silent as to the legal
status of the responsibility to protect. Nevertheless, most scholars qualify it as
a norm8 3 which might become customary international law. 84 Other authors
describe it as "soft law," 85 or as a norm becoming a legal principle, without
further specifying how this might occur.8
6
In the following Sections, I will show that the responsibility to protect
cannot be understood as a norm or even as a potential norm under customary
international law. I argue that it is futile to ask whether the responsibility to
protect has become or can become a binding norm, but that it is much more
useful to focus on existing norms of international law and to examine how the
development of the concept of the responsibility to protect and the reactions of
the relevant international actors to this development have shaped, and might in
the future shape, the international legal order.
A. Responsibility To Protect as an Emerging Norm of Customary
International Law?
1. The Ambiguity of the Concept
The first obstacle in characterizing the responsibility to protect as an
emerging norm lies in the ambiguity of the concept. The concept has not only
changed remarkably throughout its development, but it is also ambiguous in
that it incorporates a variety of notions into one concept. As it was developed
by the ICISS, it refers to a change in terminology, it comprises a conceptual
change with regard to the principle of sovereignty, it is understood as a
guiding principle for international politics, and it tries to establish criteria and
operational principles for intervention. Furthermore, some aspects of the
80. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 2.24, 6.17.
81. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30, 203.
82. In Larger Freedom, supra note 37, 135.
83. The term 'norm' is, however, not always used in a legal sense but also in a broader way in
the political science literature. See, e.g., BELLAMY, supra note 9, at 4-7; Ramesh Thakur & Thomas G.
Weiss, R2P: From Idea to Norm-and Action?, I GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 22, 23 (2009).
84. See Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the 'Responsibility To Protect': A
Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims, 20 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 533, 535 (2008);
Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility To Protect, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 703,
704 (2006); S. Neil MacFarlane, Carolin J. Thielking & Thomas G. Weiss, The Responsibility To
Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 977, 988 (2004);
Ingo Winkelmann, Responsibility To Protect, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (ROdiger Wolfrum ed., 2010), http://www.mpepil.com; see also
CHRISTOPHER VERLAGE, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 171 (2009) (arguing that the responsibility to
protect has already gained the status of customary international law).
85. Jennifer M. Welsh, The Responsibility To Protect: Securing the Individual in International
Society?, in FROM RIGHTS TO RESPONSIBILITIES, RETHINKING INTERVENTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN
PURPOSES 23, 43 (Oliver Jitersonke & Keith Krause eds., 2006).
86. Alicia L. Bannon, The Responsibility To Protect: The UN. World Summit and the
Question of Unilateralism, 115 YALE L.J. 1157, 1158 (2006) (speaking of the development of a new
international norm); Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and 2 of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513, 524
(2009) (speaking of an ongoing process of crystallization into hard international law); David Scheffer,
Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility To Protect, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 111, 115 (2007-
2008) (speaking of an emerging norm).
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responsibility to protect are formulated in terms which more strongly imply an
obligation, while other components enumerate potential measures or urge
actors to conduct themselves in a specific manner. The concept incorporates
and combines legal, political and moral language. These different notions
cannot be encompassed by a single legal norm. Even considering the potential
diversity in the structure and concreteness of norms-with some legal norms
being more open-textured than others87 and some legal norms being principles
rather than rules 88-the responsibility to protect is not a suitable candidate for
a norm. Not all aspects of the concept are fit to be translated into legal rights
and obligations. The responsibility to protect is constructed as a
comprehensive framework for the prevention and containment of massive
human rights violations. As such it cannot in its entirety become a legal norm.
Single elements of the concept possibly could be translated into single rights
and duties. But that does not make the concept as such a suitable candidate for
a legal norm.
2. Responsibility as a Legal Concept
Even if one considers a narrower approach to the responsibility to
protect and focuses on the specific responsibilities of a state as well as of the
international community to prevent, to react, and to rebuild, these notions
cannot, without difficulty, be translated into a legal norm in an intelligible
way. From a legal perspective it is not clear how the term responsibility fits
into jurisprudential categories. At least in technical legal terms, a
responsibility cannot be equated with a duty.89 The existence and violation of
a duty can be one possible ground for the responsibility of a person or a legal
entity.9° Duty and responsibility must generally be understood as two distinct
legal concepts.
However, this does not mean that the concept of a responsibility cannot
have normative content. In the context of international law, "responsibility" is
primarily used to classify the consequences flowing from the breach of an
international obligation. A breach of an international obligation that is
attributable to a state constitutes an internationally wrongful act and entails
the international responsibility of that state. 9' The international responsibility
then triggers the secondary obligations of the state, such as the duty to cease a
continuing breach or to make reparations. 92 The responsibility to protect does
not refer to this concept of state responsibility.
87. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (2d ed. 1994).
88. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28 (1977).
89. See W. Michael Reisman, Report, Tenth Commission: Present Problems of the Use of
Armed Force in International Law, Sub-group on Humanitarian Intervention, 72 ANNUAIRE DE
L'INST1TUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 237, 244 (2007) (arguing that the responsibility to protect should
not be equated with a duty to protect); David Rodin, The Responsibility To Protect and the Logic of
Rights, in FROM RIGHTS TO RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 85, at 45, 57-58 (arguing that a responsibility
can, but does not necessarily have to, encompass a duty).
90. See Christopher Kutz, Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 548, 550 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
91. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex arts.
1-2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83, (Jan. 28, 2002).
92. Id. Annex arts. 28-39.
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The term "responsibility" is not only used in this technical sense but also
in a more general way as a synonym for obligation. When the International
Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction decision states that "responsibility
is the necessary corollary of a right," 93 it uses the term as a synonym for
obligation. In other parts of the judgment, however, the court understands
responsibility in the technical sense as it is employed in the state responsibility
regime. 94 This ambiguous usage might lead to the presumption that the
responsibility to protect can be equated with an obligation, or a duty to
protect. 95 However, such an approach would neglect the proponents'
deliberate avoidance of framing the concept in terms of a legal obligation.
Otherwise one would have expected them to apply the technical legal term.
The significance of this terminology is highlighted by the fact that the United
States refused to accept then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan's proposal to
codify the international community's "obligation" in the World Summit
Outcome Document, insisting instead on keeping the weaker term
"responsibility." 96
In a different context, the term responsibility is used to refer to a set of
competences and duties. Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter, for example, vests
in the Security Council the primary responsibility for maintaining
international peace and security. 97 Article 13(2) of the U.N. Charter mentions
responsibilities of the General Assembly.98 In both cases the establishment of
such a responsibility does not by itself enlarge the scope of rights or duties of
those organs. Rather, it refers to other competences enumerated in different
chapters of the U.N. Charter.99
Theoretically, one could argue that the responsibility to protect as a
norm stipulates-in very broad and vague terms-the obligation of the
international community to act when serious human rights violations occur.
However, such an isolated norm of customary international law would hardly
encompass substantial normative content. It is only in conjunction with other,
more concrete rights or duties that such a broad norm could gain legal
significance.
93. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase,
1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5).
94. Id. at 17, 30, 36, 48, 51.
95. See, e.g., Bannon, supra note 86, at 1162; Jutta Brunne & Stephen Troope, Norms,
Institutions and UN Reform: The Responsibility To Protect, 2 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 121, 123 (2005);
Peter Hilpold, The Duty To Protect and the Reform of the United Nations-A New Step in the
Development of International Law?, 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 35, 50
(2006); Peters, supra note 86, at 539.
96. See Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility To Protect? Humanitarian Intervention
and the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 143, 165-66 (2006).
97. "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf." U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
98. "The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with respect
to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X." U.N. Charter art. 13,
para. 2.
99. Tobias Stoll, Responsibility, Sovereignty and Cooperation-Reflections on the
"Responsibility To Protect," in INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY: NEW CHALLENGES AND THE NEED FOR
REFORM? 1, 8-9 (Doris Konig et al. eds., 2008).
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3. Lack of State Practice and Opinio Juris
An additional problem in characterizing the responsibility to protect as
an emerging norm of customary international law arises with regard to the
constitutive elements of customary international law. Customary international
law-at least in its traditional understanding as codified in Article 38(1)(b) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice-requires a repeated conduct
of states that amounts to state practice and a corresponding belief that this
conduct is required by law (opinio juris). 100 Notwithstanding the general
difficulty of identifying these elements, it is particularly problematic to
recognize them in the context of the responsibility to protect. One can attempt
to identify the emergence of a customary norm by looking to the statements of
states or to their assent or acquiescence to the endorsement of the concept
within the U.N. framework. Verbal utterances' 01 as well as resolutions of
international organizations and statements of states within international
organizations can be regarded as evidence of state practice and opinio juris. 10 2
However, taking into account the before mentioned ambiguity of the concept,
it is difficult to determine to which part or version of the responsibility to
protect a specific statement alludes. Since the concept has undergone a
number of substantive changes during its development, it is far from clear
what exactly a state means when it endorses "the" responsibility to protect.
The same difficulties apply with regard to a second potential point of
departure for the emergence of customary international law, the actual
practice of states and other international actors. Since the concept of the
responsibility to protect encompasses a variety of possible reactions to a
deteriorating human rights situation in a specific state, it is relatively easy to
allege a connection between a reaction of a state or international organization
in a specific case and the concept of the responsibility to protect. The Security
Council's resolutions with regard to Darfur, for example, have been qualified
as implementing the responsibility to protect. 10 3 It is, however, far from clear
why the mere mention of the concept in the preamble of a resolution should
imply that the Security Council acts in implementing the responsibility to
protect. 104 Which part of the concept would the Security Council have
endorsed? To what extent did it influence or determine the decision-making
process? If the Security Council did act under the impression of the
responsibility to protect, did it only implement its own responsibility or the
100. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 97-98 (June 27); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
101. Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84, 10.
102. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
255 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 99; Fisheries
Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 195 (July 25).
103. See, e.g., Max W. Matthews, Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: The
Responsibility To Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 137, 148-50 (2008);
Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of Human Rights Under International Law: Will the U.N. Human Rights
Council and the Emerging New Norm "Responsibility To Protect" Make a Difference?, 35 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 353, 374 (2007).
104. In Resolution 1706, the Security Council recalled Resolution 1674 (2006), which
reaffirmed the endorsement of the responsibility to protect in the World Summit Outcome Document.
S.C. Res. 1706, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
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concept as a whole? There are no indications that the Security Council acted
in the belief that it was obliged to take a specific action due to its previous
endorsement of the responsibility to protect.
It is even more problematic to construct such an endorsement when
states or other international actors act without specific reference to the
concept. When a state resorts to sanctions against another state as a response
to human rights violations in that state, that does not necessarily mean that it
executes its responsibility to react or that it acts under the impression that it is
obliged to act due to the responsibility to protect. To interpret every action
that is mentioned within the concept of the responsibility to protect as a
possible measure and to attribute opinio juris to an actor due to the mere
mention of the concept seems arbitrary and unconvincing. Even the Security
Council's explicit reference to the responsibility to protect represents, at most,
a consensus with regard to the concept, and not with regard to specific
consequences that flow from the concept. 
05
4. Embedding the Responsibility To Protect in the Existing
Legal Framework
Finally, construing the responsibility to protect as an emerging norm is
problematic, as the responsibility was developed not within a normative
vacuum but within a complex existing legal framework. The concept touches
upon a number of existing legal norms. For example, the power of the
Security Council to act under Article 39 and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
in instances of massive human rights violations is already well-established in
the international legal order.' 6 This power is an essential component of the
responsibility to protect. To deem the responsibility to protect an emerging
legal norm is therefore to indicate that this authority of the Security Council is
similarly only an emerging norm, and not yet part of international law.'
0 7
B. Sovereignty as Responsibility?
If the responsibility to protect cannot be regarded as a norm of
customary international law, the question arises whether the conceptual
change in the understanding of the principle of sovereignty might have any
direct legal implications. At the core of the responsibility to protect lies the
assumption that sovereignty does not only constitute a right of a state against
intervention from other states but also encompasses a state's responsibility to
protect the people under its control. Some authors seem to attribute an
immediate legal impact to this conceptual change in the principle of
responsibility. Ved Nanda, for example, argues that a government can no
longer "hide behind the shield of sovereignty, claiming non-intervention by
other states in its internal affairs, if it fails to protect the people under its
jurisdiction from massive violations of human rights."' 8 States that fail to
105. Focarelli, supra note 41, at 205.
106. See infra Section IV.B.
107. Reisman, supra note 89, at 243.
108. Nanda, supra note 103, at 373.
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protect their populations against serious crimes are viewed as having
effectively waived their national sovereignty and therefore may not invoke
sovereignty against intervention. 09 Since the prohibition of the use of force
and the nonintervention principle are understood as corollaries to state
sovereignty, the conceptual change in the understanding of state sovereignty is
believed to have an immediate impact on the interpretation of these norms."
0
This approach is flawed for two reasons. First, sovereignty as
responsibility is not a new concept."' While state sovereignty has, in its
external dimension, 1 2 traditionally been understood as independence-most
prominently formulated by Max Huber in his role as arbitrator in the Island of
Palmas case' 13 -it was never meant to encompass an absolute freedom of the
state. As a norm of international law, sovereignty has always been understood
to encompass legal obligations. 1 4 The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration of
the General Assembly, for example, explicitly acknowledges the connectivity
between sovereignty and obligations under international law when it lists as
elements of sovereign equality not only certain rights of states but also their
duty to respect the personality of other states as well as to comply fully and in
good faith with their international obligations.' 15
Second, it is not possible to derive concrete legal conclusions from the
changing concept of state sovereignty. 1 6 As codified in Article 2(1) of the
U.N. Charter, sovereignty is a legal norm.11 7 At the same time, legal norms
and principles that are often seen in context with sovereignty-such as
nonintervention, territorial integrity, or legal capacity-have a legal existence
of their own, as independent legal norms. 118 A conceptual change in the
principle of sovereignty can therefore only have a limited impact on the
109. David Aronofsky, The International Legal Responsibility To Protect Against Genocide,
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Why National Sovereignty Does Not Preclude Its Exercise,
13 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 317, 318 (2007); Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility To Protect":
Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 718-20
(2007).
110. Kithure Kindiki, International Law on Trial: The Darfur Crisis and the Responsibility To
Protect Civilians, 9 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REV. 445,458 (2007).
111. Implementing the Responsibility To Protect, supra note 59, 11; BELLAMY, supra note 9,
at 33; Focarelli, supra note 41, at 194; Thakur & Weiss, supra note 83, at 26-29.
112. On the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty, see Bardo Fassbender & Albert
Bleckmann, Article 2(1), in I THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 68, 70-71
(Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002). See also Peters, supra note 86, at 517 (arguing that the responsibility to
protect "infuses external sovereignty with elements of internal sovereignty").
113. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)
("Sovereignty in the relation between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion
of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a
State.").
114. See Juliane Kokott, States, Sovereign Equality, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84, 128-29.
115. Friendly Relations Declaration, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. AIRES/8082 (Oct. 24,
1970); see Stahn, supra note 11, at 111-14; see also FRANZ XAVER PERREZ, COOPERATIVE
SOVEREIGNTY: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 331-43 (2000); Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029,
2045 (2003).
116. Focarelli, supra note 41, at 194-95.
117. "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."
U.N. Charter art. 2, para 1.
118. Peters, supra note 86, at 530 (arguing that sovereignty is conditional upon the fulfillment
of the responsibility to protect, but acknowledging that nonintervention has an "independent standing").
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context of these norms.
Sovereignty is also a structural paradigm of the international legal
system.' 19 In this rather descriptive dimension sovereignty does not have any
direct legal implications. Within the framework of the responsibility to
protect, the notion that sovereignty encompasses the responsibility of the state
applies rather to the second, conceptual dimension of the principle of
sovereignty. The ICISS Report-although it also refers to Article 2(1) of the
U.N. Charter-speaks of sovereignty as a functional principle of international
relations 120 which had to be recharacterized.121 The ICISS undertakes this
conceptual redefinition in order to reconcile the tension between sovereignty
and human rights. The ICISS Report comprises concrete proposals for
changes in the international framework for the prevention and containment of
human rights violations, but it has no bearing on the content of sovereignty as
a legal principle.
C. The Reality and Dynamics of the International Lawmaking Process
If the responsibility to protect cannot be regarded as an emerging norm
of customary international law, and if the conceptual shift in the
understanding of sovereignty as encompassing responsibilities does not, by
itself, entail any changes in the international legal order, the question arises of
how the responsibility to protect can have legal significance. Since the
concept itself cannot be understood as an existing or emerging legal norm, one
has to examine whether the rise of the concept and its endorsement by
international legal actors might have had a legal influence on existing norms,
such as the prohibition of the use of force or the system of collective security
under the U.N. Charter. Before the status of these legal norms can be
examined in light of the responsibility to protect, 22 a preliminary inquiry into
the sources of international law and into the process of international
lawmaking is required.
1. The Formal Sources of International Law
To identify norms of international law, international practitioners and
scholars regularly focus on the traditional sources as they are enumerated in
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: international
treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law. l 3 New
sources-such as legally binding resolutions and decisions adopted by organs
of international organizations-are only reluctantly admitted into the canon of
international law. 124 Based upon this formal approach to the sources of
119. CASSESE, supra note 1, at 48 (noting sovereignty as "the fundamental premise on which
all international relations rest").
120. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 1.32.
121. Id. 2.14.
122. See infra Part IV.
123. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-71 (6th ed. 2008).
124. See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 52-53 (7th ed. 1997) (analyzing whether and under which circumstances acts of international
organizations can be recognized as a separate source of law).
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international law, the endorsement of the responsibility to protect alone should
not carry any legal significance. No international agreement has been
concluded. The concept does not mirror a general principle. And since states
have not yet established a general "settled practice" accompanied by
"evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it,' 125 it has not gained the status of customary
international law. The reports of the ICISS, the High-Level Panel, and the
Secretary-General are not formal sources of international law. Since
resolutions of the General Assembly are not legally binding under
international law,126 neither is the declaration of the World Summit. And
although resolutions of the Security Council may be binding according to
Article 25 of the U.N. Charter, the mere mention of the concept in the
preamble of a Security Council resolution does not cloak the whole concept or
even parts of it with binding force under international law. The concept of the
responsibility to protect has been endorsed by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), international commissions, organs of international organizations, and
by single states and groups of states. However, none of these statements
constitute a formal source of international law.
To confine oneself to this traditional understanding of the formal sources
of international law would, however, amount to a misconception of the reality
and the dynamics of the international lawmaking process. The International
Court of Justice has already, at an early stage of its activity, indicated that it
does not limit itself to these sources. In the Corfu Channel case, the court
derived a legal obligation of the Albanian authorities to warn British ships of a
minefield from "elementary considerations of humanity."' 127 In its advisory
opinion regarding the admissibility of Reservations to the Genocide
Convention, the ICJ acknowledged that the underlying principles of the
Genocide Convention are "binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation."'128 And in the Bernadotte case, the court held that international
law gave the founding members of the United Nations the power to establish a
legal entity with objective international personality, without further
elaborating on which rule of international law it based this assertion. 129
2. The Emergence of Customary International Law as a
Normative Process
More important than these occasional escapes from the restraints of the
formal sources, however, is the methodology by which international
institutions, actors, and scholars identify and apply international law. The
conceptual construction of the formal sources of law intrinsically asks for an
125. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
126. Kay Hailbronner & Eckart Klein, Article 10, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 112, at 257, 268-73; Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest
in International Law, 250 RECUEL DES COURS 217, 262-63 (1994).
127. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
128. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
129. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174,185 (Apr. 11).
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empirical approach. In identifying treaty obligations, the jurist is expected to
look for agreements between international actors. In identifying customary
international law, one should locate the practice of state actors and examine
whether their practice is accompanied by a corresponding opinio juris.130 And
the identification of general principles of law demands a comparative inquiry
into the domestic legal systems of the community of states. 13 1 The reality of
international law, however, only remotely resembles such an approach.
In particular, the process of identifying customary international law is
far from an empirical method and can best be described as a normative, value-
oriented procedure. 132 International practice has incrementally softened the
two constitutive elements of customary international law, general practice of
states and opinio juris. While the International Law Commission, at the
beginning of its work, demanded state practice "over a considerable period of
time" for a customary norm to emerge,1 33 the ICJ did not find "the passage of
only a short period of time" to be "a bar to the formation of a new rule of
customary international law" as long as state practice was "both extensive and
virtually uniform." 134 Subsequently, the court even gave up this latter
restriction when it held in the Nicaragua case that practice did not have to be
in absolutely rigorous conformity, but that it was sufficient that the conduct of
states was in general consistent.' 35 According to some authors, the practice of
only a few or even one state may be sufficient,' 36 and even a single action may
create customary international law. 137 Moreover, when the ICJ identifies
norms of customary international law, it relies heavily on the voting behavior
of states within international organizations as well as directly on decisions and
resolutions of international organizations.'38
The identification of a norm of customary international law is therefore a
highly subjective and often result-oriented process. 139 In that process,
international jurists do not allot much significance to the actual practice of
states but pay much more attention to statements made by states-in particular
130. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 97-98 (June 27); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
131. MALANCZUK, supra note 124, at 49.
132. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 453
(2000).
133. See Working Paper by Special Reapporteur Manley 0. Hudson on Article 24 of the Statute
of the International Law Commission, [ 1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 24, 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16.
134. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20).
135. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 98 (June 27).
136. ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (1971);
KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (2d ed. 1993).
137. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source ofInternational Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 13
(1977); Karl Strupp, Les rbgles g~n~rales du droit de la paix, 47 RECUEIL DES COURS 257, 304-05
(1934).
138. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.C.J.
226, 255 (July 8); 1986 I.C.J. at 14, 99-100; Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 195
(July 25).
139. Rudolf Bernhardt, Customary International Law, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 898, 901 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992); Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary
International Law, 81 Am. J. INT'L L. 101, 101-02 (1987); Kelly, supra note 132, at 526; Frederic L.
Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 147-48 (1987); Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull
of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946, 1952-53 (1990).
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by those states which are "specially affected"'' 40 by an emerging norm-as
well as to resolutions of international organizations. Special authority in this
regard is given to resolutions of the General Assembly. 141 The broad
acceptance of a particular rule in the context of the responsibility to protect by
the overwhelming majority of all states, coming together in the General
Assembly or in another international forum, can therefore lead to the
emergence of this rule as an international legal norm.
3. The Significance of Nonstate Actors for the Lawmaking
Process
Although the lawmaking process is traditionally reserved for states, it
has become increasingly accepted that international organizations and even
NGOs exert an influence on lawmaking. 142 This development is of particular
importance for the legal status of the responsibility to protect since the
concept was introduced by a commission which-notwithstanding its ties with
the Canadian government-cannot clearly be attributed to a state. And the
further evolution was significantly expedited not only by the U.N. Secretariat
but also by actors of civil society.143 The influence of nongovernmental actors
on the lawmaking process is less clear than the influence of international
organizations. A consensus among the scholarly community is developing that
NGOs can also be recognized as international actors which influence the
lawmaking process. '44 However, at the present stage of development, the
doctrinal explanation for this process is as vague as the understanding of the
impact of civil society on the lawmaking process. Paradigmatic is Judge Van
den Wyngaert's dissenting opinion in the Arrest Warrant case in which she
criticizes the court's majority for ignoring the statements of nongovernmental
organizations and institutes that "may be seen as the opinion of civil society,
an opinion that cannot be completely discounted in the formation of
customary international law today."' 145 Judge Van den Wyngaert does not
further elucidate in what way and to what extent the court should have taken
these statements into account.
140. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20).
141. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 182 (1986); Christian
Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241-IV RECUEIL DES COURS
195, 277 (1993).
142. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213
(2002).
143. See, e.g., GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 69; INT'L COAL.
FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 69.
144. See, e.g., Louise Doswald-Beck, Participation of Non-Governmental Entities in Treaty-
Making: The Case of Conventional Weapons, in MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING 41, 41-42 (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2002); Stephan Hobe, The Role of Non-State Actors, in Particular of NGOs, in
Non-Contractual Law-Making and the Development of Customary International Law, in
DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING, supra note 4, at 319; Rahmatullah Khan,
The Anti-Globalization Protests: Side-show of Global Governance, or Law-making on the Streets?, 61
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 323, 335-45 (2001); Eibe
Riedel, The Development of International Law: Alternatives to Treaty-Making? International
Organizations and Non-State Actors, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING,
supra note 4, at 301, 304.
145. Arrest Warrant of I I April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3,
154-55 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert).
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While the legal significance of statements and opinions expressed by
actors of civil society is still very vague, they are increasingly considered in
the process of identifying norms of international law, especially norms of
customary international law.146 In this regard the report of the ICISS and the
subsequent endorsement of the responsibility to protect by NGOs might be
taken into account, although their normative weight should not be overrated.
A concept that is solely promoted by civil society without the support of states
or international organizations could not gain any legal significance within the
contemporary international legal order.
4. The Dynamic-Evolutionary Method of Charter Interpretation
With regard to the U.N. Charter, the dynamics of the international
lawmaking process entail another peculiarity. As the legal framework of the
international community, the U.N. Charter is considered a "living
instrument."' 147 This dynamic-evolutionary method of interpretation is often
derived from the conception of the U.N. Charter as the constitution of the
international community. According to this method, the Charter is to be
interpreted in an effective way and in light of the subsequent practice of states
as well as of the organs of the United Nations. 148
D. Conclusion
Although the concept of the responsibility to protect is not an emerging
legal norm, the rising recognition and acceptance of the concept may have an
influence on already existing, more concrete legal norms. With regard to the
more progressive aspects of the concept, which either do not refer to
established norms of international law or which depart from existing rules of
international law, the endorsement of the concept by the international
community might lead to a change in international law. It is then not the
concept of the responsibility to protect as such that will become a norm of
international law, but rather a concrete norm of international law that will
change in light of the responsibility to protect. One of the ways in which such
a change can take place is the establishment of customary international law.
Even without actual state practice, the statements of international actors can
confer binding force on different aspects of the responsibility to protect if they
achieve a sufficient level of concreteness and uniformity. As far as the
responsibility to protect touches upon norms of the U.N. Charter, the
146. Treves, supra note 101, 33.
147. Salo Engel, "Living" International Constitutions and the World Court, 16 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 865 (1967); Hilpold, supra note 95, at 67-68.
148. BARDo FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO 136-37
(1998); Brun-Otto Bryde, International Democratic Constitutionalism, in TOWARD WORLD
CONSTITUTIONALISM 103, 109 (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005); Georg
Ress, The Interpretation of the Charter, in I THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY,
supra note 112, at 15, 27-30; Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global Legislator": Ultra Vires or
Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 542, 570 (2005); Nico J. Schrijver, The Future of the Charter
of the United Nations, in 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 1, 5 (2006). For a
critical view, see Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The 'Federal Analogy' and UN Charter Interpretation: A
Crucial Issue, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
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endorsement can contribute to the dynamic interpretation of the Charter. For
specific rules incorporated in the responsibility to protect to become binding
law, it is therefore decisive that they are endorsed by representative organs of
international organizations-such as the General Assembly-as well as by the
community of states as a whole.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE USE OF
FORCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN LIGHT OF THE
RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT
The foregoing analysis of the international lawmaking process has
shown that the responsibility to protect cannot be understood as a norm of
customary international law. It has also shown that the conceptual change in
the sovereignty principle that lies at the heart of the concept does not imply
any immediate legal changes. However, this does not mean that the
endorsement of the responsibility to protect by important actors of
international law does not have any legal impact. In the light of the dynamic
and open-structured process of international lawmaking, such an endorsement
can lead to a modification of existing norms of international law. Against this
background, the question arises as to whether the endorsement of the
responsibility to protect and its various components has changed international
law. I begin this analysis with the prohibition of the use of force and the
nonintervention principle and then look at the powers, competences, and
duties of the Security Council, the General Assembly, regional organizations,
as well as single states acting outside of the institutional framework of the
United Nations.
A. The Prohibition of the Use of Force and the Nonintervention
Principle
The prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter has rightly been described as "the corner-stone of the Charter
system."' 49 Notwithstanding its inherent weaknesses, which stem primarily
from the malfunctioning of the collective security system in the way originally
envisioned by the framers of the U.N. Charter, 50 international law has until
now withstood all attempts bK states or scholars to restrict the scope and
content of the provision. 1 The prohibition of the use of force is
complemented by the nonintervention principle, which prohibits coercive
intervention into the exclusively domestic affairs of a state. 152 At first view,
149. JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 414 (6th ed. 1963); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 732 (7th
ed. 2008).
150. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter
Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 642-45 (1984).
151. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 112, at 112, 117-24.
152. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 107-08 (June 27);
Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 84, 1. With regard to interventions by the United Nations, the nonintervention
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the concept of the responsibility to protect does not delimitate the prohibition
of the use of force or the nonintervention principle. The ICISS emphasizes the
norm of nonintervention as the obligation to respect every other state's
sovereignty 153 and affirms the bedrock nonintervention principle found in
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter.' 54 Neither does the World Summit Outcome
Document imply any dilution of those prohibitions.
However, an implicit case for limiting the scope of the prohibition of the
use of force as well as of the nonintervention principle could be made in light
of the conceptual construction of sovereignty as encompassing responsibility.
The concept of sovereignty as responsibility implies the conditionality of
sovereign rights.' 55 The sovereign right to nonintervention is deemed to be
conditional on the state fulfilling its responsibility to protect the people within
its territory. It is therefore argued from the logic of rights that when a state
fails to fulfill its responsibility, it does not have a right against outside
interventions undertaken to secure the rights of the people. 156 Taken seriously,
this approach-which is hardly new 1-cannot convincingly explain why
interventions should be subject to any legal criteria. The only threshold for
intervention would be the question of whether a state lives up to its human
rights obligations. If this threshold were passed, a state would not have a
sovereign right on which it could base a claim against intervention. From the
inherent logic of this construction it is not possible to argue, for example, that
the intervention must be proportional or to explain why measures must be
subject to the right intention of the intervening state. If the state does not have
a sovereign right against intervention, how could an intervention which is not
proportional or not carried out for righteous motives violate this right? If,
however, one was to subject the intervention to certain legal limits-as almost
all proponents of humanitarian intervention would-then the question arises
why some of the legal restrictions should apply and not all of them. From the
perspective of the logic of rights, which is deemed to stem from the concept of
sovereignty as responsibility, one can only argue that no legal restrictions
exist on interventions when a state violates its responsibility toward its
citizens. The legality of specific intervening measures cannot therefore be
answered by a reference to the conceptual shift in the understanding of
sovereignty. It can only be answered by international legal norms that define
the scope and limits of state sovereignty in a more concrete way.
But even if one accepted that a change in the understanding of
sovereignty could have an immediate impact on concrete legal norms, the
notion of sovereignty as responsibility would not necessarily grant an
argument in favor of intervention. Although the nonintervention norm has a
close connection to the principle of sovereignty, the existence and scope of the
principle is codified in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter. With regard to interventions by states, it is
recognized as customary international law.
153. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 2.8.
154. Id. 16.2.
155. Rodin, supra note 89, at 55.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALITY 178 (3d ed. 2005) (arguing that state sovereignty presupposes respect for human rights
and that states that commit serious crimes forfeit their protection under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter).
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former does not depend on the latter. Nonintervention has a legal basis of its
own. Its conceptual basis lies not only in the principle of state sovereignty, but
it is itself a structural principle of the international order. Nonintervention is
owed not only to individual states but also to the international community as a
whole. 158 It would therefore be too short-sighted to suspend the
nonintervention principle on the grounds that a state has violated its human
rights obligations. Such an argument would neglect that the nonintervention
principle is not only an individual and sovereign right of the single state but
also a structural principle of the international legal system. One can, therefore,
accept the notion of conditional sovereignty-a concept of sovereignty that
implies respect for fundamental human rights-without at the same time
concluding that the principle of nonintervention does not apply when a state
violates its human rights obligations.
B. The Powers and Competences of the Security Council
The concept of the responsibility to protect envisions the Security
Council as the most important international actor. Responsibility to protect
deals with the competences of the Security Council with regard to the
prevention and containment of massive human rights violations, tries to
develop threshold criteria for Security Council action, aims at reducing the
abusive use of the veto power, and emphasizes that the Security Council has
not only a right to intervene but also a responsibility to protect people from
serious crimes.
1. Competences Under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter
Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter vests the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in the Security Council. 59 In
order to satisfy this responsibility, the Security Council can invoke a number
of competences under the Charter. When a conflict arises and the mechanisms
for peaceful dispute settlement under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter are
insufficient, the Security Council can resort to an array of measures under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. These instruments include provisional
measures (Article 40 of the U.N. Charter), economic or diplomatic sanctions
(Article 41 of the U.N. Charter), and, as a last resort, the authorization of the
use of force (Article 42 of the U.N. Charter). Before the Security Council can
take coercive action it determines whether a specific situation constitutes a
threat to the peace, a breach of the _peace, or an act of aggression according to
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter.' 6 In practice the Security Council usually
refrains from characterizing a situation as a breach of the peace or as an act of
aggression and has mainly determined whether a certain condition can be
158. Peters, supra note 86, at 534.
159. Seesupra note 97.
160. "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N.
Charter art. 39.
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regarded as a threat to the peace.
161
Particularly after the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has
significantly widened the scope of what can constitute a threat to the peace.
1 62
According to this practice, the severe violation of human rights within a state
can qualify as a threat to the peace and trigger coercive measures under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. In 1965, the Security Council found a
proclamation of independence by a minority group within Southern Rhodesia
to be a threat to the peace.' 63 The Security Council held that the apartheid
regime in South Africa itself constituted a threat to the peace,' 64 but rather
than emphasize the regime's oppression of persons internally, the Council
focused on the potential destabilizing effect the regime might bring on
neighboring states. In later instances, the Security Council more directly
referred to the human rights situations in Somalia, 165 Rwanda, 166 and East
Timor' 67 as threats to the peace. This conceptual shift was acknowledged in a
statement by the President of the Security Council in which he stipulated that
the mere absence of war and military conflict among states does not itself
ensure international peace and security-rather, intrastate humanitarian
situations can also become threats to peace and security.'
68
A convincing case can be made for the legality of the Security Council's
extensive reading of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. Although human rights
violations are not explicitly mentioned in that provision, the term "threat to
the peace" is open-textured and allows for a broad reading. 169 This open
language is even more significant contrasted with the much narrower focus of
Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which stipulated that war
or the threat of war was a concern of the whole League of Nations. 170
Statements made at the San Francisco conference indicate that the drafters of
the U.N. Charter deliberately intended to leave the determination of what
constitutes a threat to the peace to the discretion of the Security Council.
17
This approach is further supported by the ruling of the International Court of
Justice in the Certain Expenses case in which the court held that every organ
161. Erika de Wet & Michael Wood, Peace, Threat to, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84, 6.
162. See MICHAEL J. MATHESON, COUNCIL UNBOUND: THE GROWTH OF UN DECISION MAKING
ON CONFLICT AND POSTCONFLICT ISSUES AFTER THE COLD WAR 41-64 (2006); Jennifer M. Welsh, The
Security Council and Humanitarian Intervention, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND
WAR 535, 537-53 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
163. S.C. Res. 271, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/271 (Sept. 15, 1969).
164. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. SIRES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977).
165. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
166. S.C. Res. 929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (June 22, 1994).
167. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999).
168. Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992).
169. Reisman, supra note 89, at 243; see also W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis
in the United Nations, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 83, 93 (1993) (arguing that the "threat to the peace" criteria in
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter was designed to be determined subjectively).
170. "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the
League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take
any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations . League of
Nations Covenant art. 11, para. 1.
171. United Nations Conference on International Organization, S.F., U.S., Apr. 25-June 26,
1945, Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Rapporteur, on Chapter VIII, sec. B, U.N. Doc. 881 (English)
111/3/46 (June 10, 1945), reprinted in III UNCIO XII 502, 505.
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of the United Nations principally determines the scope of its jurisdiction. 172
And it is backed by a dynamic-evolutionary reading of the U.N. Charter which
draws upon the constant practice of the Security Council. In this regard the
responsibility to protect does not, on the first view, add anything substantially
new to the competences of the Security Council under Article 39 and Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. It is, therefore, rather confusing that the ICISS Report
as well as the report of the High-Level Panel place this authority of the
Security Council within a concept which they deem to be an "emerging
norm .
''173
The endorsement of the responsibility to protect and the explicit
commitment to the power of the Security Council to act in cases of genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in the World
Summit Outcome Document 174 is not, however, without significance.
Although it is widely acknowledged under international law that the Security
Council can take coercive and even military action for humanitarian purposes,
this question is far from being uncontroversial.175 The text of Article 39 of the
U.N. Charter does not preclude such a broad interpretation, but it also does not
support the humanitarian reading. Furthermore, the practice of the Security
Council is not necessarily consistent. The Council acts on a case-by-case
basis, and often emphasizes the unique character of a situation in which it
decided to intervene.' 76 It only rarely chooses to base its determination under
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter on humanitarian reasons alone, instead
complementing its determinations with references to the negative
transboundary consequences of a deprived humanitarian situation. 177 The
endorsement of the responsibility to protect can therefore contribute to the
entrenchment of the power of the Security Council to take humanitarian
action. More importantly, the responsibility to protect endows humanitarian
action by the Security Council with a higher degree of legitimacy. While
states and scholars have only rarely challenged the legality of the extensive
practice of the Security Council, they have at times questioned its
legitimacy. 178 Through its endorsement of the responsibility to protect, in
particular at the World Summit, the international community moved from
tolerating the practice of the Security Council to explicitly approving it. The
unanimous endorsement of humanitarian Security Council action at the 2005
World Summit, therefore, provides its proponents with a convincing argument
in favor of the legality and legitimacy of such action.
172. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20).
173. Reisman, supra note 89, at 243.
174. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 41,1 139; see also ICISS REPORT, supra
note 2, 11 6.16-.17.
175. The contrary view is expressed by Reisman, supra note 89, at 174; and Peters, supra note
86, at 538.
176. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
177. DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF
THE UN CHARTER 152 (2001).
178. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple-Order, Justice and the UN: A
Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 341 (1995).
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2. Threshold for Action
Acknowledging the competence of the Security Council to mandate
coercive action in order to prevent or contain human rights violations does
not, however, answer the question of whether a certain threshold has to be
reached before the Security Council can act. During the evolution of the
responsibility to protect different kinds of threshold criteria have been
discussed. The ICISS Report refers to "situations of compelling need for
human protection" in which "preventive measures fail to resolve or contain
the situation" and in which "a state is unable or unwilling to redress the
situation."' 79 For measures below military force no specific threshold for
action is specified. The report merely states that the barrier for political,
economic, and judicial measures can be set lower than the threshold for
military intervention.'8 In contrast, the ICISS Report sets out rather detailed
criteria for military action.18 1 Similar criteria for military action can be found
in the High-Level Panel Report. 182 The World Summit, however, does not
pick up on these specific criteria but stipulates in rather broad terms that the
international community is prepared to take collective action through the
Security Council if peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities are
manifestly failing to protect their populations. '93 According to the World
Summit, the system of collective security would, therefore, only come into
play in instances where the state bearing the primary resp4onsibility for its
population "manifestly" fails to live up to its responsibility.
These attempts to introduce a threshold for action have been criticized as
potentially restricting timely and effective measures by the Security Council.
The establishment of military action as a "last resort" has been characterized
as an unnecessary burden on the Security Council, which would have to
"patiently wend its way through diplomatic measures and economic
sanctions" before it could use military measures to end genocide. 185 Other
authors highlight that substantive criteria would establish a clear benchmark
against which to judge the humanitarian claims of states.' 86 However, from a
legal perspective, the discussion of such criteria has not changed the existing
law. Even in the ICISS Report, those criteria relate to the legitimacy of
Security Council action, not to its legality.' 87 It is not clear if they are meant to
put a legal restriction on the scope of Security Council action. The same
applies to the High-Level Panel Report, which discusses these criteria under
the heading of legitimacy. 188 The World Summit Outcome Document, on the
other hand, establishes a rather vague threshold when it refers to the
179. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 4.1.
180. d. 4.2.
181. Id. I 4.10-.43.
182. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30, 207.
183. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 41, 139.
184. Id.
185. Reisman, supra note 89, at 244.
186. See Nicholas J. Wheeler & Frazer Egerton, The Responsibility To Protect: 'Precious
Commitment'or a Promise Unfulfilled?, I GLOBAL REsP. To PROTECT 114, 121-22 (2009).
187. Evans, supra note 84, at 710-11.
188. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30, 9 204-207.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 35:469
"inadequacy" of peaceful means. 189 No clear "last resort" criterion is
employed. Therefore, it appears that there are no compelling substantive limits
on a determination by the Security Council with regard to when peaceful
measures are inadequate and military action is deemed to be necessary. The
same can be said concerning the qualification that the failure of a state to
protect its population must be "manifest."'' 90 It is hardly conceivable that the
Security Council could acknowledge a case of massive human rights
violations without recognizing a manifest failure of the state.
A certain restraint on Security Council action might, however, result
from the concept of shared responsibility. Throughout the development of the
responsibility to protect, it has been continuously highlighted that the primary
responsibility to protect lies with the state. 191 While this conceptual
construction is meant to emphasize the obligation of a state and the
conditionality of its sovereignty, it might also be used to argue for a restrictive
use of the instruments under the U.N. system of collective security. As long as
it is not clear that a state has failed to live up to its responsibility, it could be
argued that the residual responsibility of the international community has not
yet been triggered. In fact, it is exactly this potential restraint on intervention
that facilitated consensus on the responsibility to protect at the World
Summit.1
92
However, there are no established criteria to determine when the
responsibility shifts from the state to the international community. From a
legal perspective, the responsibility to protect does not establish-at least not
at the present stage of its development-any substantive limits on Security
Council action. With regard to the use of force, a basic limitation stems from
the principle of proportionality as a general legal principle restricting action
on the part of the Security Council. 193 The constant emphasis that military
force may not be the first choice of the Security Council, but rather has to be
the "last resort," can be read as an affirmation of the general applicability of
the proportionality principal in international law. At the same time, it is hardly
conceivable that it could substantively limit Security Council action with
regard to genocide or other serious crimes. The principle of proportionality
leaves a wide margin of appreciation to the Security Council. And practice
shows that military action is usually not the starting point, but the endpoint of
an escalating array of measures taken with regard to a conflict.
Apart from the strictly legal dimension, the concept of dual
responsibility might prove to be a political obstacle for collective action.
States may oppose Security Council action on the grounds of their primary
responsibility and make it harder for the proponents of an intervention to
argue that the responsibility of the international community is evoked. This
potential impediment on the part of the responsibility to protect materialized
189. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 41, 139.
190. Id.
191. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2,932.29.
192. Nicholas J. Wheeler, A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility To Protect
After the 2005 World Summit, 2 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 95, 96, 102 (2005).
193. Jochen Abr. Frowein & Nico Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII, in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 112, at 701, 711-12.
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in the Darfur crisis. During the Security Council deliberations, states
emphasized the primary responsibility of Sudan, and that a collective response
would be premature. 194 The responsibility to protect may, therefore, even
hinder an effective and timely reaction to genocide or other massive human
rights violations.
3. Exercise of the Veto Power
According to Article 27(3) of the U.N. Charter, decisions of the Security
Council shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the
concurring votes of the permanent members.1 95 While it is well-established
practice that abstention does not avert a decision, 96 the U.N. Charter confers a
veto right to the permanent members of the Security Council. While this veto
power is commonly considered a necessary prerequisite for the great powers'
engagement in the United Nations, 97 it paralyzed the Security Council during
the Cold War and continues to prevent Security Council action in cases where
one or more permanent member has an interest in avoiding such action.
Moreover, the preferential treatment of five states is deemed to be
anachronistic and undemocratic and increasingly undermines the legitimacy of
the Security Council and its decisions. The reform of the Security Council is,
therefore, a permanent item on the perennial agenda of U.N. reform.'98 A
reform of the veto power has at times been discussed 99 but has not played a
significant role during the last round of the reform discussion, which focused
on an enlargement of the Security Council in order to make it more
representative. 200 Since any change in the institutional structure of the
Security Council needs the approval of the permanent members of the
Security Council, 20' the international community seems to have accepted that
the permanent members will not voluntarily renounce their veto privilege.
202
Alternative attempts to make the Security Council more effective
therefore aim at restraining the use of the veto within the existing institutional
194. See Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility To Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and
Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 31, 33 (2005); Staln, supra note 11, at
116-17 (speaking of a "complementarity trap"); Wheeler, supra note 192, at 102.
195. "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members .... U.N. Charter art.
27, para. 3.
196. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. 16, 22 (June 21); FASSBENDER, supra note 148, at 178.
197. Thomas Bruha, Security Council, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE
1147, 1157-58 (Riidiger Wolfrum ed., 1995). For a historical account, see FASSBENDER, supra note 148,
at 163-70.
198. For an overview of the history of the reform debate, see Wolfram Karl, Bemd Muitzelburg
& Georg Witschel, Article 108, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra
note 112, at 1341, 1356-57.
199. See, e.g., FASSBENDER, supra note 148, at 263-75.
200. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30, T 244-260; In Larger Freedom, supra note
37, 167-170. There is, however, a far-reaching consensus that new members of the Security Council
should not be provided with a veto right.
201. See U.N. Charter arts. 108-09.
202. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30, 1256 ("We see no practical way of changing
the existing members' veto powers.").
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structure and without an amendment of the U.N. Charter. The ICISS Report
highlights the pivotal role of the Security Council and the unacceptable and
unbearable prospect that "one veto can override the rest of humanity on
matters of grave humanitarian concern., 20 3 The ICISS Report suggests that the
permanent members of the Security Council agree on a code of conduct for
the use of the veto according to which they refrain from exercising their veto
rights with regard to actions that need to be taken to stop a humanitarian crisis
when no vital national interests of the permanent five members are
involved. 204 While the ICISS sees no prospect for a respective Charter
amendment, it suggests that the permanent members adopt a "formal,
mutually agreed practice." 205 The High-Level Panel picks up on this
proposal-albeit in weaker terms-when it asks for a use of the veto power
limited to matters of vital interest.2°6 The reports of the Secretary-General do
not explicitly refer to any formal restriction of the use of the veto. And an
earlier draft of the World Summit Outcome Document "invite[d] the
permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using the veto in
cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity." Nevertheless, the permanent members could not even agree to
this moderate language. In a letter to the President of the General Assembly,
the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, John Bolton, expressed that the
United States would not accept any legal obligation of the Security Council or
of the permanent members under the responsibility to protect. Following
this political intervention, the reference to a restrictive use of the veto was
deleted from the text.
The endorsement of the responsibility to protect therefore does not
establish any legal restraints on the use of the veto. Even the proposal of the
ICISS, which was supported by the High-Level Panel, did not suggest that
such limits existed or that they should be imposed on the Security Council
from the outside. It demanded action from the permanent members, and the
permanent members-maybe with the exception of France, whose Minister of
Foreign Affairs initiated the idea in the first place209-- clearly demonstrated
their reluctance to such a restriction on their powers. The possibility of
deeming a veto "illegal" due to a violation of the responsibility to protect can
therefore only be seen as a proposal de legeferenda.2 P
Even if the responsibility to protect does not legally restrict the use of
203. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 6.13, 6.20.
204. Id. 6.21.
205. Id.
206. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30, 256.
207. President of the General Assembly, Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level
Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005, 119, U.N. Doc.
A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2 (Aug. 5,2005).
208. Letter from John R. Bolton, Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations (Aug. 30,
2005) (on file with author).
209. See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY To
PROTECT: RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND 379 (2001).
210. Lloyd Axworthy & Allan Rock, R2P: A New and Unfinished Agenda, I GLOBAL RESP. TO
PROTET 54, 61 (2009).
211. See Peters, supra note 86, at 539-40. But see Louise Arbour, The Responsibility To Protect
As a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice, 34 REV. INT'L STUD. 445, 453-54 (2008) (arguing
that the exercise of the veto could violate the vetoing state's obligation under the Genocide Convention).
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the veto, the concept might have an influence on the behavior of the
permanent members of the Security Council. It highlights that the veto power
entails a corresponding responsibility of the permanent members. Unlike
Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter, which refers only to the responsibility of the
Security Council for peace and security, the responsibility to protect links the
power of the Security Council explicitly to the humanitarian responsibility for
the well-being of individuals. The further entrenchment of the concept within
international politics might make it harder for a permanent member to justify
the use of the veto politically. Utilizing the concept of the responsibility to
protect, the international community can exercise pressure on a state that
threatens to block a humanitarian decision with its veto, However, the
prospect of success of such an approach is rather bleak, since the criteria for
action under the responsibility to protect are very vague. In addition, the veto
power is hardly ever explicitly exercised. The mere threat of a veto is usually
sufficient to ban an item from the Security Council agenda.
4. Duty To Act?
Notwithstanding the legal ambiguity of the term "responsibility," 212 the
responsibility to protect implicitly suggests mandatory Security Council action
in the face of massive human rights violations. The Security Council's
objections to the idea of mandatory action are reflected in its positions on the
responsibility to protect following the ICISS Report. The High-Level Panel
Report focuses more on competences than on obligations of the Security
Council and mentions the collective responsibility of the international
community only cautiously. 213 Similarly, the Secretary-General has spoken of
a responsibility of the international community but has not referred to a
specific responsibility of the Security Council. 214 The World Summit is even
more restrictive in the limited responsibility of the international community it
acknowledges, and it emphasizes nonmilitary measures. 215 Security Council
action is left to a case-by-case evaluation of the appropriate reaction. John
Bolton's letter to the President of the General Assembly clearly articulates one
member state's refusal to accept any legal obligation of the Security
Council. 21 6 In light of these developments, the responsibility to protect neither
establishes nor supports the idea that the Security Council is under a legal
obligation to take action when a humanitarian crisis occurs.
C. The Powers and Competences of the General Assembly
When the Security Council fails to authorize a humanitarian
intervention, the question arises whether other international actors can
substitute this authority and provide a legal justification for military action.
Although the U.N. Charter explicitly recognizes only two exemptions from
212. See supra Subsection I1I.A.2.
213. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30, 199-203.
214. In Larger Freedom, supra note 37, 135.
215. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 41, 138-139.
216. Letter from John R. Bolton, supra note 208.
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the prohibition of the use of force-self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter and authorization by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter2 7-altemative means of authorizing the use of force have been
considered. Within the institutional framework of the United Nations, the
General Assembly appears to be the only organ potentially capable of
authorizing coercive measures if the Security Council failed to act. Article
24(1) of the U.N. Charter establishes the primary responsibility of the Security
Council with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,
thereby leaving room for a secondary or residual competence of the General
Assembly.21 8 Consequently, Article 10 of the U.N. Charter vests a broad
competence in the General Assembly to discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of the Charter, and Article 11 of the U.N. Charter explicitly
extends this competence to questions of international peace and security.
2 19
Article 12(1) of the U.N. Charter, however, prohibits the General Assembly
from making recommendations as long as the Security Council is exercising
its functions under the Charter with regard to a particular dispute or
220
situation. Under the U.N. Charter, the General Assembly plays only a
limited role within the system of collective security.
The Uniting for Peace Resolution constitutes an attempt to enlarge the
221
role of the General Assembly in this regard. It was adopted in 1950 against
the background of the Security Council's incapability to act due to the
USSR's strategy to use its veto power to prevent support for the Republic of222
Korea against military aggression from North Korea. Through the Uniting
for Peace Resolution, the General Assembly claims a subsidiary responsibility
with regard to international peace and security, and aims at overcoming the
paralysis of the U.N. system of collective security. In its most important part,
217. Article 107 of the U.N. Charter, the so-called enemy state clause, does not have practical
relevance anymore. Georg Ress, Article 107, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 112, at 1330, 1332.
218. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 148 (July 9); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 162-163 (July 20).
219.
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in
the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with
regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United
Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United
Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12,
may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states
concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is
necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before
or after discussion.
U.N. Charter art. 11, paras. 1-2.
220. "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests." U.N.
Charter, art. 12, para. 1.
221. Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 3, 1950).
222. Barbara Nolte, Uniting for Peace, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE,
supra note 197, at 1341.
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the resolution concludes:
[T]hat if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or
act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a
view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures,
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
223
Procedurally, the resolution establishes the basis for emergency sessions
of the General Assembly and accordingly amends the General Assembly's
rules of procedure. Substantively, the resolution provides for the competence
of the General Assembly to recommend coercive measures and even the use
of force. While the legality of different aspects of the resolution has been
subject to controversy,224 its practical relevance is rather marginal. The
resolution has been used to convey emergency sessions and to make
recommendations, ranging from appeals to end hostilities225 to asking for the
establishment of a peacekeeping operation. 226 Only in the Korea crisis has the
General Assembly recommended coercive measures, 227 and since the relevant
resolution does not mention the Uniting for Peace Resolution, it is debatable
whether this actually constituted an example of action within the Uniting for
Peace framework.22
Furthermore, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution the General
Assembly is limited to making nonbinding recommendations. 22 It cannot
oblige the member states to take action. A General Assembly resolution that
recommends the use of force does not, by itself, justify the use of force by
states. 23° This reading is supported by Article 11(2) of the U.N. Charter,
according to which the General Assembly may discuss and make
recommendations with regard to questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security but has to refer the question to the Security231
Council if "action" is necessary. The ICJ has clarified that "action" in the
sense of Article 11(2) of the U.N. Charter means coercive or enforcement
action which is solely within the province of the Security Council under
223. Uniting for Peace, supra note 221, 1.
224. For an overview, see Christina Binder, Uniting for Peace (1950), in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84, 13-22.
225. G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI), U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 7, 1971).
226. G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-I), U.N. Doc A/3354 (Nov. 5,1956).
227. G.A. Res. 498 (V), 4, U.N. Doc. A/1775/Add. 1 (Feb. 1, 1951).
228. See MALANCZUK, supra note 124, at 392-93 (arguing that in light of the invasion of the
Republic of Korea the coercive action of states might be regarded as the exercise of collective self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter).
229. Implementing the Responsibility To Protect, supra note 59, 63; Jean Krasno & Mitushi
Das, The Uniting for Peace Resolution and Other Ways of Circumventing the Authority of the Security
Council, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 173, 191
(Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008).
230. Binder, supra note 224, 30. But see Reisman, supra note 89, at 246 (arguing that a
humanitarian intervention authorized by the General Assembly would not constitute a violation of
international law).
231. See supra note 219.
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232Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Against this background it comes as a surprise that the ICISS Report
discusses in great detail the possibility of regarding the General Assembly as a
233
source of authority for military intervention. The ICISS Report highlights
the General Assembly's fallback responsibility with regard to the maintenance
of international peace and security and concludes that although the Assembly
has only recommendatory powers, "an intervention which took place with the
backing of a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly would clearly have
powerful moral and political support., 2 34 Furthermore, the ICISS Report
regards the mere possibility that the General Assembly could recommend an
intervention as an "important additional form of leverage on the Security
Council to encourage it to act decisively and appropriately."235 Within the
subsequent endorsements of the responsibility to protect, however, the
General Assembly does not play any role in the context of the authorization of
the use of force. The High-Level Panel, the Secretary-General, and the World
Summit unequivocally confirm that the Security Council is the sole organ that
can authorize the use of force.
236
As a consequence, the responsibility to protect does not add much to the
existing status of the General Assembly under international law. It merely
refers to the Assembly's competences under the U.N. Charter and the Uniting
for Peace Resolution and to the legitimizing force the endorsement by the
Assembly would have for an intervention. The ICISS Report does not suggest
that a resolution by the General Assembly could legalize an intervention
which takes place without a Security Council mandate. To argue that a
recommendation by the General Assembly "might have a moral and political
weight sufficient to categorize the use of force as 'legal' even without the
Security Council's endorsement' ' 237 is to misconceive the fundamental and
qualitative difference between legality and legitimacy. The concept of the
responsibility to protect clearly distinguishes and respects these different
categories.
The Secretary-General's 2009 report on Implementing the Responsibility
To Protect highlights a different dimension of the Uniting for Peace
Resolution. While the Secretary-General does not consider that the General
Assembly could legally authorize a military intervention, he regards it as an
appropriate forum to consider sanctions below the threshold of military
force. While this does not enlarge the scope of sanctions, the General
Assembly could, according to this proposal, become a forum for the
coordination of sanctions by individual member states when the Security
232. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 164-65 (July
20).
233. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, I 6.7, 6.29-30.
234. Id. 6.7.
235. Id. 16.30.
236. The World Summit Outcome Document only notes "the role of the General Assembly
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Charter." World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 41, 80.
237. Thomas G. Weiss, The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, 26 WASH. Q. 147, 155
(2003).
238. Implementing the Responsibility To Protect, supra note 59, 57.
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Council does not decide upon collective action.
D. The Powers and Competences of Regional Organizations
The ICISS Report also identifies collective interventions by regional or
sub-regional organizations as a possible alternative when the Security Council
fails to act. 239 Regional organizations are deemed to be at times better suited
and more willing to take action. 24 At the same time, the ICISS Report
acknowledges that according to Article 53(1) of the U.N. Charter, military
action without the consent of the affected state or a justification under Article
51 is legal only if it is authorized by the Security Council.24 1 The ICISS
Report, however, continues to refer to cases in which regional organizations
have carried out an intervention and only subsequently sought the approval of
the Security Council 24 2 and declares that "there may be certain leeway for
future action in this regard., 243 In this regard, the ICISS proposal clearly
244departs from the U.N. Charter.
Despite this deviation, the responsibility to protect cannot be deemed to
have changed international law with regard to the powers of regional
organizations. The ICISS Report itself is rather cautious and does not identify
an accepted trend in practice but rather speculatively concludes that there may
be an opening for future development. 245 More importantly, subsequent
endorsements of the responsibility to protect have been much more restrictive
regarding intervention by regional organizations without prior authorization of
the Security Council. The High-Level Panel Report emphasizes that regional
organizations have to act within the U.N. framework, although it recognizes
• . 246
the possibility of an ex post facto authorization in urgent situations. The
Secretary-General does not discuss regional organizations within the
responsibility to protect concept. The World Summit refers to Chapter VIII of
the U.N. Charter and declares that collective action will be taken "in
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate. 2 47 The most
authoritative endorsements of the responsibility to protect thereby do not
acknowledge the possibility that an intervention by a regional organization
could be legal due to an ex post facto authorization by the Security Council.
E. Unilateral and Collective Action Outside the U.N. Charter
Framework
One of the most controversial topics touched upon by the responsibility
to protect is the question of whether individual states or coalitions of states
may exercise the responsibility to protect through coercive or even military




243. Id. T 6.35.
244. Hilpold, supra note 95, at 52.
245. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, T 6.35.
246. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30, T 270-273.
247. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 41, I 93, 139.
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means without Security Council authorization. The legality of unilateral
humanitarian intervention has to be distinguished from the legality of
nonmilitary countermeasures. Finally, the responsibility to protect raises the
question of whether there is a duty of single states to act when other states
violate human rights.
1. Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
The legality of military intervention for humanitarian purposes without
authorization by the Security Council has been the subject of the most
controversial debates. Moral and political considerations blend in with the
legal discourse and increase its complexity. Nevertheless, the U.N. Charter
generally prohibits the use of force and provides only for narrow exceptions.
Some scholars have argued that humanitarian interventions do not violate the
territorial integrity or political independence of a state and therefore do not
fall under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.248 Others have made the case for
the permissibility of humanitarian intervention in light of morality and human
rights.249 Such attempts to restrict the scope of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
or to enlarge the number of exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force
250have thus far failed to meet the consensus of the international community.
In light of the mechanisms of the international lawmaking process, a
convincing case for the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention would
require overwhelming support by the international community, including the
vast majority of states and international organizations. Unilateral humanitarian
interventions without authorization of the Security Council have at times been
silently tolerated.251 However, this does not mean that they have become legal,
even though the international community might not impose significant
penalties on states that intervene in order to prevent or contain genocide.
252
Even the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo has most prominently been
qualified as "illegal but legitimate. 253 The international community is far
from having reached a consensus with regard to the legality of unilateral
humanitarian intervention. The majority of states explicitly refuse to accept
that such interventions could be deemed legal.254
Might the emergence of the responsibility to protect have changed this
state of the law? Some authors argue that the endorsement of the concept
supports the claim that unilateral military intervention could be legal even in
248. W. Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention To Protect the
Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177 (Richard B. Lillich ed.,
1973).
249. TES6N, supra note 157.
250. Randelzhofer, supra note 151, 53-56; see also Reisman, supra note 89, at 248. For a
passionate defense of the ius contra bellum, see Ant6nio Augusto Cangado Trindade, International Law
for Humankind: Toward a New Jus Gentium (pt. 1), 316 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 122-45 (2005).
251. See Thomas M. Franck, When, if Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior
Security CouncilAuthorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 51, 64-65 (2001).
252. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND
ARMED ATTACKS 191 (2002).
253. INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2000); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal
Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1999).
254. See BROWNLIE, supra note 149, at 744.
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255the absence of an authorization by the U.N. Security Council.   Such a
reading relies more on a subjective understanding of the concept than on its
actual content. The ICISS Report accepts the U.N. Charter framework and
determines the Security Council as the most appropriate body to authorize
humanitarian interventions.256 While the ICISS Report falls short of explicitly
deeming unilateral humanitarian intervention without a Security Council
mandate illegal, it could not find a consensus with regard to the "validity" of
unauthorized interventions. Accordingly, it characterizes the bypassing of the
Security Council as "damage to international order., 257 The ICISS Report
merely points out that such interventions are likely to happen if the Security
Council fails to live up to its responsibility and indicates the damage this
might entail to the legitimacy of the Council.258 Furthermore, the declaration
in the ICISS Report that every state has a responsibility to react to serious
human rights violations does not automatically imply that every state has a
right to intervene militarily even without authorization by the Security
Council. Neither can the assertion of a conceptual change in the understanding
of sovereignty lead to such an assumption. 259 Therefore, the ICISS Report
does not provide an argument in favor of the legality of unilateral intervention
without an authorization of the Security Council.260
Such an argument can, furthermore, not be derived from subsequent
endorsements of the concept. The High-Level Panel focuses on Security
Council action and does not deal with the enforcement of the responsibility to
protect by individual states or state coalitions. 261 The Secretary-General
emphasizes that the task was "not to find alternatives to the Security Council
as a source of authority but to make it work better"262 and points out that the
concept does not alter, but rather reinforces the legal obligation of member
states to refrain from the use of force except in conformity with the U.N.
263Charter. The World Summit Outcome Document, however, while not
supporting unilateral intervention, encompasses more ambivalent language.
The heads of state and government do not explicitly state that the Security
Council is the only instance of authority with regard to military interventions,
and they do not explicitly rule out alternative means of coercive action against
grave human rights violations. Nonetheless, the World Summit Outcome
Document places the responsibility to protect within the institutional
framework of the United Nations and the Security Council in particular. At
the same time, the section of the World Summit Outcome Document on the
use of force may be read as not excluding the unauthorized use of force. The
255. VERLAGE, supra note 84, at 293-331; C.F. Amerasinghe, The Conundrum of Recourse to
Force-To Protect Persons, 3 INT'L ORGS. L. REV. 7, 46-47 (2006); Bannon, supra note 86, at 1162-63;
Kindiki, supra note 110, at 458; see also Venkateswara S. Mani, "'Humanitarian" Intervention Today,
313 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 297 (2005) (criticizing the responsibility to protect because it legitimizes
unilateralism outside of the framework of the U.N. Charter).
256. ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, 6.14.
257. Id. 1 6.37.
258. Id. 6.38-.40.
259. See supra Section III.B.
260. Evans, supra note 84, at 711-12.
261. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 30, 203.
262. In Larger Freedom, supra note 37, 126.
263. Implementing the Responsibility To Protect, supra note 59, 3.
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world leaders reiterate their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of
force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter and stress the importance of
acting in accordance with its purposes and principles. 264 This wording leaves
room for the possibility to resort to force without Security Council
authorization in order to pursue the purposes of the U.N. Charter, which
according to Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter include the respect for human
rights. As John Bolton's letter to the President of the General Assembly
indicates, the United States did not want to "preclude the possibility of action
absent authorization by the Security Council.
265
Even in light of some rather ambivalent statements, the responsibility to
protect does not entail any change with regard to the legality of humanitarian
interventions without prior authorization of the U.N. Security Council. While
the relevant documents do not rule out such interventions, they neither
explicitly nor implicitly make a claim for the legality of unauthorized
intervention.
266
Recent international practice unfortunately confirms the fear that the
responsibility to protect might be used as a justification for unauthorized
interventions by single states. The United States and the United Kingdom
referred to serious human rights violations committed by Saddam Hussein and
the Ba'ath regime in order to legitimize the invasion of Iraq. 267 Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov employed the responsibility to protect in the
context of Russia's use of force in Georgia. 28 Although scholars have
269convincingly argued against this kind of availment of the concept, these
incidents show how susceptible to abuse the responsibility to protect is. They
fuel the resentment of states such as Cuba, Venezuela, Sudan, Pakistan, and
Nicaragua, which prominently voiced their criticism toward the concept
during the 63rd Session of the General Assembly.
270
2. Countermeasures Below the Threshold of Military Force
One widely accepted aspect of the responsibility to protect is the
responsibility of the international community to react to serious crimes with
measures below the threshold of the use of force.27' When serious human
rights violations occur, other states are allowed to react to this violation
through diplomatic, political, or economic sanctions. Even the rather
restrictive World Summit Outcome Document acknowledges the international
264. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 41, 77, 79.
265. Letter from John R. Bolton, supra note 208.
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Voinov Kohler eds., 2009); Thakur & Weiss, supra note 83, at 37.
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community's responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and
other peaceful means through the United Nations. 272 This is remarkable
considering the World Summit's general reluctance to accept a more concrete
responsibility to prevent or to consider particular responsibilities of the
Security Council. Within this context, the question arises of what measures
individual states may resort to in order to exercise their responsibility to
protect. They may implement economic, diplomatic, or political sanctions that
were imposed by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Outside of the Charter framework, a state may react to massive human rights
violations by way of a retorsion, a sanction that is "unfriendly" but does
not violate any international obligation of the acting state.273 A state may
generally cease its economic or diplomatic cooperation with another state at
its will. However, in the modern international legal system, which is
characterized by intense cooperation among states, the unilateral imposition of
economic, diplomatic, or political sanctions may easily constitute a breach of
international law. 274 For example, a state that imposes economic sanctions
against another state may violate its obligations under WTO law or other
multilateral or bilateral treaties.
Likewise, the freezing of assets of a foreign state normally constitutes a
violation of that state's property rights.275 If such measures are not justified
under specific treaty provisions or authorized by competent international
organizations, the question arises whether they can be justified under general
international law as a countermeasure. A countermeasure can be defined as an
act of noncompliance by a state with its obligations toward another state,
taken in response to a previous international wrongful act of that state and
directed against that state.276 Such countermeasures are lawful and preclude
the wrongfulness of the violation of the state's international obligation if they
are carried out in accordance with specific procedural and substantial
277
requirements.
This availability of countermeasures is widely recognized under general
international law. 278 However, due to the bilateralist structure of international
279legal relationships, only the state to which an international obligation is
owed can resort to countermeasures. 280 This approach is reflected in the
International Law Commission's 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
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Article 42 of the ILC Articles establishes that a state is entitled as an injured
state to invoke the responsibility of another state if that state breached an
obligation and that obligation was owed to the state that wants to invoke the
responsibility. 28' According to Article 49(1) of the ILC Articles, the injured
282
state is allowed to resort to countermeasures. 2 This enforcement mechanism
is insufficient with regard to the responsibility to protect. The responsibility to
protect aims at preventing or containing human rights violations that take
place within the territory of a particular state. Unless nationals of another state
are victims of these human rights violations, there is no injured state in the
sense of Article 42 of the ILC Articles that could resort to measures under the
ILC regime of state responsibility. However, the obligations encompassed by
the responsibility to protect-obligations stemming from the prohibition of
serious human rights violations-are owed not only to single states but to the
international community as a whole, as obligations erga omnes. 21 In its
Barcelona Traction dictum, the ICJ assumed that the prohibition of genocide
and the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person
fall within the scope of obligations erga omnes.284 This recognition of the
erga omnes character of the obligations in question does by itself not
significantly widen the scope of action for states. Article 48(1)(b) of the ILC
Articles stipulates that a state that is not injured by a violation may invoke the
responsibility of the violating state when the breached obligation is an
obligation erga omnes. 28 But according to Article 48(2) of the ILC Articles,
this entitlement to invoke responsibility merely encompasses that states may
claim cessation, assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition, as well as the
performance of the obligation of reparation from the responsible state.
286
The prohibitions of the serious crimes encompassed by the responsibility
to protect are, moreover, recognized as peremptory norms of international law
(jus cogens).287 According to Article 40 of the ILC Articles, the serious breach
of an obligation under peremptory norms of general international law triggers
a subset of specific legal consequences. 288 The crimes encompassed by the
responsibility to protect would certainly fulfill this requirement, but again, the
specific consequences linked to the qualification of an act as a serious breach
of an obligation under peremptory norms are rather limited. According to
Article 41(1) of the ILC Articles, states shall cooperate to bring any serious
breach to an end through lawful means, and Article 41(2) of the ILC Articles
prohibits recognizing as lawful a situation created by a serious breach or
rendering aid or assistance in maintaining such a situation.289 With regard to
the right of not directly affected states to resort to countermeasures-so-called
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282. Id. at 11.
283. Kindiki, supra note 110, at 466; Peters, supra note 86, at 526.
284. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32
(Feb. 5).
285. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 91, at 11.
286. Id.
287. Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 84, at 541; Neville F. Dastoor, The Responsibility To
Refine: The Need for a Security Council Committee on the Responsibility To Protect, 22 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 25, 26-27 (2009).
288. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 91, at 9.
289. Id.
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collective countermeasures or countermeasures of general interest 9 -Article
54 of the ILC Articles stipulates that the chapter of which it is a part does not
prejudice the right of any state to take lawful measures against other states to
ensure cessation of the breach and reparation. 291 The ILC Articles do not,
however, answer the question of whether the resort to countermeasures by
states that are not directly affected is legal when a serious breach of a
peremptory norm is involved. The ILC Articles deliberately leave the question
open "to the further development of international law."
292
Can the endorsement of the responsibility to protect provide an
argument in favor of the legality of such countermeasures in the general
interest exercised by states that are not directly affected by a violation of
international law? The ICISS Report views measures short of military action
293
as an integral part of the responsibility to react. It does not, however, clearly
distinguish between retorsions and countermeasures, and it does not
specifically answer the question of whether countermeasures may be taken
only upon authorization by the U.N. Security Council, only by injured states,
or by all states. The examples for possible sanctions given by the ICISS
Report include measures which are usually taken by individual states
unilaterally or collectively with other states. 294 The commission was,
furthermore, aware of the practice that sanctions are used unilaterally and
collectively by individual states and by the United Nations. 295 And while the
ICISS Report sees the authority to legalize a military intervention
concentrated in the Security Council, it does not limit other sanctions to the
U.N. framework or to injured states. The responsibility to protect is a
responsibility of the international community as a whole. Therefore, every
member of the international community should have the right to respond with
nonmilitary countermeasures if a state does not live up to its responsibility.
Against this background, the inclusion of sanctions in the endorsement of the
responsibility to react can be regarded as an argument favoring the legality of
nonmilitary collective countermeasures.
The High-Level Panel Report hardly addresses this issue and does not
provide an argument for or against collective countermeasures. While the
report acknowledges the responsibility to protect and sees it as a responsibility
of the wider international community, 296 it does not specify to which measures
individual states can resort outside of the institutionalized framework of the
United Nations. As with military interventions, the High-Level Panel
discusses sanctions solely with regard to the U.N. Security Council.
297
Similarly, the Secretary-General discusses sanctions only in the context
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of the Security Council.298 However, within his treatment of the responsibility
to protect, he emphasizes that the international community should use
"diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights
and well-being of civilian populations. 2 99 Only where such measures appear
insufficient may the Security Council take action under the U.N. Charter.
300
Although he does not explicitly endorse collective countermeasures, the
Secretary-General nevertheless accentuates the importance of collective action
outside the U.N. framework with regard to nonforcible measures.
The World Summit also treats sanctions exclusively within the
institutional framework of the Security Council.30 l Within the context of the
responsibility to protect, the use of diplomatic, humanitarian, and other
peaceful means is also limited to action "through the United Nations" and
"through the Security Council."
30 2
The impact of the responsibility to protect on the right of states that are
not directly affected to resort to countermeasures is ambiguous. On the one
hand, the analyzed reports do not explicitly approach this question. And while
the responsibility to protect aims at committing states to act when serious
crimes occur, it does not explicitly widen the scope of possible actions
available to states. As a general principle, a state has to keep within the limits
of international law even when acting to fulfill an international obligation.
303
On the other hand, the endorsement of the responsibility to react is built upon
the presumption that states have a corresponding right to act. It would be
illogical-or at least in need of further explanation-to postulate a
responsibility of states to take action when those states had no right to act.
With regard to the right to military intervention, the problem of a
responsibility to react without such a right-in the absence of an authorization
by the Security Council-is openly approached and discussed. 3 4 With regard
to nonmilitary countermeasures, the reports are mostly silent. Thus, the
authors of the reports and the states that endorsed the responsibility to protect
tacitly authorized the right of not directly affected states to resort to
countermeasures when massive human rights violations occur.
This reading is supported by the ICISS Report's list of possible
nonforcible measures within the context of the responsibility to react. 305
According to the ICISS, such measures can be imposed not only by the
Security Council but also by the international community of states. At the
same time, the measures envisioned by the ICISS would, at least to a large
degree, amount to a violation of international law: arms embargoes, financial
sanctions and aviation bans usually require a justification. According to the
traditional bilateral conception, countermeasures would be limited to states
directly affected by a violation of international law. But the human rights
298. In Larger Freedom, supra note 37, 1 109-110.
299. Id. 9 135.
300. Id.
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303. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 1.C.J. 91, T 430 (Feb. 26).
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violations that form the basis of the responsibility to protect will usually
violate obligations erga omnes and not directly violate individual rights of
other states. Thus, there would be no state that could execute the sanctions
that are enumerated in the ICISS Report. The ICISS Report therefore almost
logically requires that the serious violations of human rights-which
constitute violations of obligations erga omnes-entail the right of every state
as a member of the international community to resort to nonforcible
countermeasures.
The admissibility of collective countermeasures is a controversial
subject. In a number of cases, states have resorted to such countermeasures in
response to violations of obligations erga omnes, especially if such violations
concerned human rights. 0 6 During the discussions of the ILC on the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, states voiced different concerns against the
admissibility of collective countermeasures. 307 Nevertheless, there has been a
rather broad acceptance on the side of states with regard to such
countermeasures at least when serious breaches of obligations erga omnes are
concerned .308 Nonmilitary countermeasures are much more accepted under
international law than are unilateral humanitarian interventions. The ILC did
not find a clear prohibition on such countermeasures but explicitly left the
process open for further development. 309 Against this background, the
endorsement of the responsibility to protect can be regarded as an argument in
favor of the admissibility of collective countermeasures. The consolidation of
such a right will depend on future statements and practices of states, as well as
on the reactions of other members of the international community to instances
in which states that are not directly affected claim to exercise countermeasures
in the interest of the international community.
3. Duty To Act?
Finally, the question arises whether the conceptual shift proposed by the
responsibility to protect entails a legal obligation to act when massive human
rights violations occur. International law already imposes limited obligations
on states in this regard. The parties to the 1948 Genocide Convention confirm
that they undertake to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide. 310 The
substantive content of this obligation is, however, rather weak. The
Convention deals mainly with punishment and does not substantiate the
obligation to prevent genocide. Only Article VIII of the Genocide Convention
stipulates that states may call upon competent U.N. organs to take appropriate
action for the prevention of genocide. 3 1 On the other hand, the International
Court of Justice emphasized the legal significance of the obligation to prevent
306. See TAMS, supra note 275, at 208-28; Crawford, supra note 274, 391-394.
307. See TAMs, supra note 275, at 241-49.
308. Id. at 248.
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genocide in its 2007 judgment in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro, where it found that the former Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia had violated its obligation to prevent the genocide in
Srebrenica.312 And since the violations encompassed by the responsibility to
protect constitute serious breaches of an obligation arising under a peremptory
norm of general international law, Article 41(1) of the ILC Articles applies
and imposes on states the duty to cooperate to bring such a breach to an end
through lawful means.
The responsibility to protect creates no further legal obligations on
states. The concept avoids the language of legal obligations, relying instead on
the weaker notion of a responsibility. 313 The endorsements following the
ICISS Report do not offer any textual hook from which to derive a legal
obligation. According to the High-Level Panel, the responsibility to protect
has to be exercised through the U.N. Security Council, 314 and the World
Summit Outcome Document intentionally avoids any language that could be
interpreted as imposing legal obligations on individual states.
In conclusion, current international law does not impose a duty to
intervene, and the endorsement of the responsibility to protect does not create
such a duty.315 If any duty is derived from the concept of the responsibility to
316protect, it is only a moral duty.
V. CONCLUSION
The concept of the responsibility to protect has been described as the
"most dramatic normative development of our time." 317 From a legal
perspective, this characterization has to be relativized. This Note has shown
that the endorsement of the responsibility to protect has not significantly
impacted international law. The prohibition of the use of force and the
principle of nonintervention are left intact. The responsibility to protect adds
little to the competences of the U.N. Security Council but rather reaffirms the
well-established dynamic reading of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. The
concept does not create legally binding substantive criteria for Security
Council action and does not legally restrict the use of the veto power by the
permanent members. The responsibility to protect does not legally obligate the
Security Council to act. The powers and competences of the General
Assembly as well as of regional organizations remain legally unchanged,
although the concept reiterates the role of the General Assembly and could
lead to a revitalization of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Furthermore, the
responsibility to protect does not support the legality of humanitarian
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intervention without Security Council authorization. However, with regard to
the right of states that are not directly affected to respond with nonmilitary
countermeasures to the human rights violations encompassed by the
responsibility to protect, the concept can be seen as a further step toward the
legality of such countermeasures in the general interest.
From a legal perspective, the normative content of the responsibility is,
therefore, evolutionary rather than revolutionary. 318 The responsibility to
protect is construed primarily as a nonlegal concept. It is an attempt to
establish a more concrete set of criteria and procedures to determine when the
responsibility of the international community to intervene is triggered.319
Responsibility in this sense cannot be equated with a legal obligation or duty,
but has to be understood as a political or moral responsibility. This assessment
is not meant to diminish the significance of the concept. Political and moral
implications may have a much greater impact on the conduct of international
actors than legal norms. The responsibility to protect may encourage
governments to act in the face of blatant violations of human rights.
This legal conclusion may disappoint proponents of a more progressive
approach. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between what the law is
and what one would like the law to be. It is ultimately the willingness and
capability of state representatives that will decide whether and how to
implement the responsibility to protect in particular cases. Therefore, only a
realistic approach to the applicable legal framework can ensure that the
responsibility to protect will not become one of the myriad sophisticated and
ambitious concepts that international legal scholarship has produced but that
have failed to leave an impression on the reality of international law and
politics.
In that regard, the analysis presented in this Note may support the
promotion of the responsibility to protect in three ways. First, if it is accepted
that the responsibility to protect is already deeply rooted in international law
and that its implementation neither requires nor entails significant changes to
international law, the discussion can then focus on the real obstacles to the
prevention of genocide and other serious human rights violations. The legal
framework offers a wide range of measures that states can take individually
and collectively as well as through the United Nations and regional
organizations. Political problems, rather than legal disagreements, and the lack
of will among international actors remain the principal impediment to an
effective U.N. collective security system and to the implementation of the
responsibility to protect. U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frdchette
noted before the 2005 World Summit: "[I]n many cases, the failure of the
international community to protect the vulnerable has been a product of
complacency on the part of those who endorse the responsibility to protect,
and not from those who have reservations about it."
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Second, the invocation of the responsibility to protect by the United
States in the Iraq invasion and by Russia during the Georgia conflict shows
the potential for abuse of the concept, a potential which is rooted in, among
other things, the uncertainty that surrounds the status as well as the content of
the concept. It therefore seems necessary to clarify the legal rules applicable
to nonforcible and military interventions and their relationship to the
responsibility to protect. It is not possible to justify an intervention by simply
claiming to act in fulfillment of the responsibility to protect. Justifications
have to be located within the established rules of international law. While
more legal clarity will not entirely prevent future misuse of the responsibility
to protect, it might make it more difficult to employ the concept as a pretext
for violations of international law.
Third, acknowledging that core components of the responsibility to
protect are already part of international law might help to gain political
support for implementing and further developing the responsibility to protect.
This acknowledgment might rebut the criticism that the "responsibility to
protect" is nothing but an apologetic euphemism for humanitarian
intervention, carried out by Western states to further their self-interest. To
counter its skeptics, the responsibility to protect cannot be perceived as wholly
progressive or as a revolutionary concept in international law.
The responsibility to protect is a remarkable political and moral concept
that has become established in international politics and scholarship. It does
not answer every question or solve every problem but it offers some important
conceptual insights into the relationship among sovereignty, responsibility,
and intervention. Its three sub-responsibilities constitute a more
comprehensive and coherent approach to the prevention and containment of
genocide and other massive human rights violations. While it has not
significantly changed the international legal framework, it has had an
important impact on the political discourse. It remains to be seen whether, in
the long run, the responsibility to protect becomes a helpful tool for
international decisionmakers that can be deployed in humanitarian crises and
help to prevent and contain genocide and other serious human rights
violations.
